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Globalization's  Impact  on 
Compliance  with  Labor  Standards 
A 
number  of  critics  have  argued  that  the  competitive  pressure  imposed 
by  international  competition  is  likely  to create  a  race  to  the bottom  in 
global  labor  standards.  These  antiglobalization  forces  frequently  claim  that 
competition  induced  by  globalization  leads  firms  to  ignore  (or  fail  to com 
ply  with)  labor  standards  in efforts  to cut  costs.  Exporters  facing  the  chal 
lenges  of  international  markets  as well  as multinationals  facing  cheap  imita 
tors  from  low-wage  regions  may  each  cut  costs  by  paying  lower  wages, 
hiring  child  labor,  and  imposing  unsanitary  working  conditions  on  their 
workers. 
From  this  perspective,  globalization  is  likely  to  undermine  national 
efforts  to  impose  labor  standards.  Even  if countries  are  successful  in passing 
legislation  that  introduces  or  raises  labor  standards,  global  pressures  may 
prevent  firms  from  adhering  to  them.  This  is  likely  to be  the  case  when 
penalties  for  noncompliance  are  low. Under  such  circumstances,  labor  stan 
dard  legislation  (such  as minimum  wage  laws)  may  be  viewed  simply  as  a 
useful  but  nonbinding  guideline  for wage-setting  activities. 
On  the other  hand,  increasing  political  activity  by  human  rights  organiza 
tions  has  focused  greater  scrutiny  on  the behavior  of  exporting  firms  and 
large multinationals.  These  types  of  firms  are  increasingly  being  held  to 
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Figure  1. Average  Wages,  the Minimum  Wage,  and  Compliance  in  Indonesia,  1990-99 
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high  standards. While  there  are  no  clear  international  penalties  for deviation 
from  local  labor  legislation,  the  effect  on  a  firm's  reputation  is potentially 
significant,  as  enterprises  like Nike  have  learned. 
In an  effort  to  shed  some  light  on  the  larger  question  of  labor  standards 
and  globalization,  we  seek  to examine  compliance  with  minimum  wage  leg 
islation  in  Indonesia.  Indonesia  is an  ideal  case  study  because  the  govern 
ment  made  minimum  wages  a  central  component  of  its  labor market  poli 
cies  in the  1990s.1  During  this  time, minimum  wages  quadrupled  in nominal 
terms  and  doubled  in  real  terms  (see  figure  1). At  the  same  time  that  the 
minimum  wage's  real  value  was  soaring,  Indonesia's  entry  into  international 
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Figure  2.  Share  of  Value  of  Indonesian  Manufacturing  Output  Generated 
by  Foreign  Ownership  or  Exported,  1990-99 
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markets  also  increased  dramatically  (see  figure  2).  The  manufacturing  cen 
sus  shows  that  the  percentage  of  manufactured  output  that was  exported 
doubled  between  1990  and  1996,  from  just  over  15 percent  to 30  percent  of 
final  sales.  In addition,  foreign  investment  also  increased.  The  percentage  of 
manufacturing  output  accounted  for by  foreign  firms  almost  doubled  in  the 
1990s,  rising  from  13 percent  of  output  to more  than  25  percent  of  total 
manufacturing  output  in  1999. 
During  the  1990s,  firms  struggled  to comply  with  the rising  minimum 
wage.  Rama  shows  that  the  increasing  minimum  wage  led  to a  10 percent 
increase  in  average  wages,  2  percent  fall  in employment,  and  5  percent 
average  decline  in  investment.2  Using  the manufacturing  census  plant-level 
data  for  Indonesia,  we  calculated  average  production  and  nonproduction 
worker  wages  relative  to  the  statutory  minimum  from  1990  through  1999. 
As  indicated  by  the  trends  in figure  1, the  ratio  of  production-worker  wages 
to  the minimum  wage  fell  from  a  factor  of  more  than  3-to-2  in  the  early 
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1990s  to nearly  1-to-l  in  the  late  1990s.  This  indicates  that average  produc 
tion-worker  wages  were  hovering  just  above  the minimum  wage  before  the 
1997  financial  crisis.  The  proportion  of  plants  paying  at  least  the minimum 
declined  significantly  during  this  period.  While  three-quarters  of  all  plants 
paid  above  minimum  wages  to production  workers  in  the mid-1980s,  by 
1999  only  about  half  of  all  plants  paid  average  wages  that  exceeded  the 
statutory  regional  minimum  for production  workers. 
In  this paper  we  estimate  the  relationship  between  international  competi 
tion  and  compliance  with  the  statutory  minimum  wage  in  Indonesia.  We 
identify  firms  facing  international  competition  with  two  plant-level  indica 
tors. First,  we  use  the plant's  export  orientation  as  one  measure  of  interna 
tional  competition.  Second,  we  use  the plant's  foreign  ownership  as  another 
measure  of  international  competition.  Critics  claim  that  foreign  firms  are 
exploiting  foreign  workers,  although  our  research  on  developing  countries 
has  shown  that foreign  enterprises  are more  likely  to pay  higher  wages.3 
This  framework  provides  a direct  test  of  the  relationship  between  meas 
ures  of  globalization  and  labor  standards,  as defined  by  compliance  with  the 
regional  minimum  wage.  As  such,  this  proposed  research  follows  pioneer 
ing work  by  Edmonds  and  Pavcnik,  which  explores  how  rice  prices  affected 
the  use  of  child  labor  in Vietnam.4  Edmonds  and  Pavcnik  find  that  an 
increase  in rice  prices,  which  followed  the  elimination  of  an  embargo  on 
rice  exports  in  Vietnam,  is associated  with  a decline  in  the use  of  child  labor. 
While  one  advantage  of  Edmonds  and  Pavcnik  is  that  they  are  able  to use 
exogenous  changes  in rice  prices  to  identify  the  impact  on  child  labor,  our 
paper  has  the advantage  that  it can  establish  a direct  link between  trade  ori 
entation,  ownership,  and  compliance  with  labor  laws  across  manufacturing 
plants.  To  our  knowledge,  ours  is  the  first  attempt  to  identify  the  impact  of 
global  factors  on  compliance  with  labor  standards  using  plant-level  data. 
We  find  that  there  is a positive  relationship  between  compliance  with 
labor  standards,  outward  orientation  as measured  by  export  sales,  and  for 
eign  ownership.  Exporting  plants  are more  likely  to pay  at  least  the mini 
mum  wage.  However,  we  also  find  that  there  is a  significant  upward  trend 
in compliance  with  minimum  wage  legislation  for  exporting  enterprises 
during  the  1990s.  Since  there  is  significant  heterogeneity  in worker  and 
firm  characteristics  across  industries,  we  then  turn  to an  examination  of  the 
3. Aitken,  Harrison,  and  Lipsey  (1996);  Scorse  (2003). 
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garment  and  apparel  industry. We  find  these  same  trends  in garments  and 
apparel. 
Our  results  are  consistent  with  the  increasing  internal  and  external  pres 
sures  placed  on  Indonesia  by  human  rights  activists  and  other  organizations 
in  the  1990s.  Internally,  several  independent  labor  unions  were  established 
in  Indonesia  in  the  early  1990s.  Externally,  North  American  and European 
Union  (EU)  groups  expressed  concern  about  Indonesian  exporters  and  the 
labor market  conditions  of  their workers,  particularly  in exporting  sectors. 
Complaints  by U.S.  groups  were  filed  first  in  the  late  1980s  and  again  in 
1992,  citing  violation  of  worker  rights  under  the Generalized  System  of 
Preferences  (GSP).  The  GSP  allows  poor  countries  to benefit  from  low  tar 
iffs  on  their  exports  to  the U.S.  market.  Although  the GSP  excludes  textiles 
and  apparel  imports  subject  to  the  Multifibre  Agreement  (MFA),  as well  as 
footwear,  the  fact  that  a  large  share  of  Indonesian  exports  to  the United 
States  (20  percent)  are  covered  by  the GSP  was  enough  to generate  consid 
erable  pressure.5  In  addition,  the  Indonesian  SMERU  Research  Institute 
notes  that "the withdrawal  of  investment  guarantees  to U.S.  companies  that 
would  ensue  was  a  threat of  potentially  greater  significance."6 
In  response  the  Indonesian  government  made  a  number  of  policy 
changes  in  its minimum  wage  laws  in  the  1990s.  Our  analysis  suggests  that 
the  government  was  successful  in raising  compliance  with  the minimum 
wage,  at  least  in exporting  sectors  that were  the  focus  of U.S.  and European 
criticism. 
The  Labor  Standards  Debate 
In  the  1990s,  international  concern  over  globalization  and  labor  stan 
dards  increased  dramatically.  One  way  to  gauge  the  extent  of  this  new 
found  interest  is  to count  the  number  of  articles  about  labor  standards  that 
appeared  in major  newspapers  in  the  1990s.  As  figure  3  demonstrates,  the 
number  of  articles  about  sweatshop  and  child  labor  activities  increased  dra 
matically.  There  was  a 300  percent  increase  in  the number  of  articles  regard 
ing  child  labor,  and  the number  of  articles  focusing  on  sweatshop  activities 
increased  by more  than 400  percent. 
5.  See  Elliott  (1998a)  for  a discussion  of  the U.S.  GSP  and  its  impact  on  labor  standards. 
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Figure  3. Articles  about  Sweatshops  and  Child  Labor  in  Major  Newspapers,  1990-99* 
Number  of  articles 
Source:  LexisNexis. 
a. Lexis  maximum  is 1,000 articles. 
For  many  globalization  opponents,  international  labor  standards  have  a 
strong  intuitive  appeal  as  a  remedy  for  various  forms  of  exploitation  and 
poor  working  conditions  common  throughout  the world,  particularly  in, but 
not  to  limited  to, developing  countries.  If nations  would  only  agree  on  some 
minimum  set  of  standards,  then with  one  grand  sweep  working  conditions 
would  be  raised  for  all,  or  so  the  story  goes.  However,  as with  many  well 
intentioned  policies,  the  reality  is not  quite  so  simple,  and motives  of many 
people  who  support  labor  standards  may  not  be  so benign.  In order  to assess 
more  accurately  their potential  effectiveness,  a number  of  questions  arise. 
Who  sets  the  standards?  How  are  they  enforced  and  who  pays  for  this 
enforcement?  What  is  the  punishment  for  noncompliance?  What  are  the 
employment  effects  associated  with  increases  in wages  or  costs  for  firms? 
What  would  likely  be  the  distributional  effects  both  across  and  within 
countries? 
Given  these  complexities,  it is no  surprise  that depending  on  how  and  to 
what  extent  labor  standards  are  implemented,  they may  or may  not  be  bene 
ficial  for  the world's  poorest  (and most  vulnerable)  workers,  whose  interests Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  51 
the  standards  are meant  to  address.  The  effects  will  largely  depend  on  the 
general  level  of  development  of  the  country,  for  example,  the  level  of  edu 
cation,  technology,  and  infrastructure.  In addition,  the  economy's  share  of 
exports  may  play  an  important  role  if other  countries  decide  to erect  import 
barriers  based  on  noncompliance. 
Although  there  are more  than  180  international  conventions  (treaties) 
that address  labor-related  issues,  the  International  Labor  Organization  (ILO) 
has  established  a core  set of  labor  standards,  which  it articulated  in  its "Dec 
laration  of  Fundamental  Principles  and  Rights  at  Work."  Typically,  labor 
standards  can  be  divided  into  two  groups:  core  standards,  which  relate  to 
fundamental  human  rights  and  can  be  universal  in  their  application,  and 
economic  standards,  which  are more  closely  tied  to a country's  level  of  eco 
nomic  development  and  include  elements  such  as minimum  wage  laws,  lev 
els  of  benefits,  and  working  conditions.  Core  labor  standards  are  further 
divided  into  four  groups: 
?freedom  of  association  and  the right  to collectively  bargain, 
?elimination  of  forced  and  compulsory  labor, 
?elimination  of  employment  discrimination,  and 
?abolition  of  child  labor. 
Two  conventions  pertain  to each  of  these  headings,  for  a  total  of  eight 
core  conventions.  Ratification  of  these  standards  is  left  to  individual  mem 
ber  states.  Only  ninety-five  nations  (including  most  European  nations)  have 
signed  all  eight,  though  most  countries  have  signed  at  least  one  convention. 
Interestingly,  the United  States  has  signed  only  two  of  the eight.  Upon  sign 
ing  a convention,  a nation  is  subject  to:  international  supervision,  technical 
and  financial  support  (mostly  for  poorer  countries),  and  potential  punish 
ment  for  noncompliance  (although  the  ILO's  enforcement  powers  are weak 
to nonexistent). 
Chau  and Kanbur  postulate  that  if ratification  of  these  conventions  were 
costless,  or  if  the benefits  greatly  outweighed  the  costs,  one  would  expect 
complete  compliance  across  countries.7  Given  that  this  is not  the case,  Chau 
and Kanbur  investigate  the  determinants  of  signing.  They  find  little  evi 
dence  that  variables  predicted  by  standard  economic  theory?such  as  per 
capita  gross  domestic  product  (GDP),  degree  of  openness  to  trade,  or  aver 
age  education?are  determining  factors,  but  rather  that  countries  with 
higher  domestic  standards  have  a higher  probability  of  adoption.  This  indi 
7. Chau  and  Kanbur  (2001). 52  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
cates  that adoption  may  be  a good  proxy  for  labor  standards  and  a country's 
legal  system  plays  an  important  role,  perhaps  because  domestic  enforce 
ment  costs  are  highly  correlated  with  different  legal  structures.  Given  the 
poor  predictive  power  of  standard  economic  variables,  they  conclude  that 
the current  understanding  as  to why  countries  choose  to  sign  these  conven 
tions  is  severely  limited  and more  research  is needed. 
An  issue  of  paramount  concern  in any  analysis  of  labor  standards  is who 
will  shoulder  the  costs  of  increased  labor  standards.  If an  industry  is per 
fectly  competitive,  additional  costs  will  be  passed  directly  to consumers  and 
some  firms  will  likely  be  forced  out  of  business,  whereas  in  imperfectly 
competitive  industries  added  labor  costs  will  be  borne  by  producers  as well, 
the  proportion  depending  on  the  relative  slopes  of  the demand  and  supply 
curves.  Some  of  the more  celebrated  and  recent  successes  with  respect  to 
labor  standards  in developing  countries  involve  pledges  by  many  of  the 
world's  largest  shoe  and  garment  manufacturers,  such  as Nike  and Gap,  to 
pay  substantially  higher  wages  in  their  South  Asian  factories.  Even  though 
the margins  in  these  industries  are  reportedly  very  small,  these  companies 
obviously  had  some  room  to maneuver  while  still maintaining  profitability. 
It  is  interesting  to note  that Nike  is now  planning  on moving  many  of  its 
Indonesian  factories  to Vietnam,  where  the  average  wage  is much  lower, 
although  the company  claims  it  is moving  for  reasons  of  political  stability. 
Issues  surrounding  child  labor probably  best  highlight  the  tensions  inher 
ent  in  most  discussions  involving  a move  to  stricter  international  standards. 
Since  most  child  labor  takes  place  in  the  poorest  countries  of  the world, 
notably  in Southeast  Asia,  one might  reasonably  suspect  that  these  countries 
would  be  the most  supportive  of  any  initiatives  to ban  or  limit  the practice. 
However,  the opposite  is  true. Fearing  that  such  bans  are  simply  disguised 
forms  of  trade  protectionism,  many  high-ranking  officials  in  India,  China, 
and  other  developing  countries,  as well  as  union  activists,  have  spoken  out 
strongly  against  these  efforts,  which  they  think will  unfairly  reduce  their 
country's  exports.  While  agreeing  that  child  labor  needs  to be  taken  seri 
ously,  these  officials  point  out  that without  the  option  of  sweatshop  work 
many  children  would  be  in far worse  situations,  often  involving  prostitution 
or  violent  criminal  behavior.  This  position  is  reminiscent  of  the quote  by 
economist  Joan Robinson  who  said  "in  some  situations  what  is worse  for  a 
worker  than being  exploited  is not  being  exploited." 
These  arguments  need  to  be  taken  seriously.  Discussions  regarding 
wealthy  countries'  labor  standards  are  often  accompanied  by  claims  that Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  53 
home  country  industries  are being  forced  to compete  unfairly  with  develop 
ing  country  manufacturers  who  can  draw  on  limitless  pools  of  cheap  labor. 
In addition,  it  is hard  for many  people  in developed  countries  to  imagine 
states  in which  sweatshop  labor  represents  the best  hope  to get  ahead  in  life. 
Yet  this  is certainly  the  case  in  large  parts  of  the world.  Neither  of  these 
points  suggest,  however,  that  simply  because  sweatshops  may  represent  the 
best  of  a host  of  excruciatingly  unpleasant  alternatives,  corporations  should 
be  allowed  to  ignore  some minimal  set of  labor  standards. 
Economic  theory  may  inform  one  that  the  equilibria  one  witnesses  in 
international  labor markets?which  are  based  (almost  exclusively)  on  vol 
untary  exchange?are  Pareto  optimal.  This  does  not  mean  that  societies 
have  to accept  them  from  a normative  standpoint.  This  brings  one  back  to 
the  initial  questions  concerning  the practical  implementation  of  any  policies 
that  attempt  to  impose  stricter  labor  standards,  as well  as  how  one  goes 
about measuring  their effectiveness. 
Those  who  argue  for  import  restrictions  on  countries  that  employ  child 
labor believe  that  this would  provide  an  incentive  for  violating  countries  to 
limit  the practice.  However,  others  argue  that  if  import  barriers  lead  to  lower 
incomes  this  will  only  exacerbate  the  problem,  and  in  fact  the  rising 
incomes  associated  with  freer  trade will  directly  lead  to decreases  in child 
labor. Edmonds  and  Pavcnik  address  this  question  empirically  using  panel 
data  from Vietnam  to  investigate  whether  increases  in  the domestic  price  of 
rice,  associated  with  increased  rice  exports,  has  led  to higher  or  lower  inci 
dences  of  child  labor.8 They  find  that  in  rural  areas,  where  most  people  are 
both  rice  producers  and  consumers,  the  income  effect  of  higher  rice  prices 
has  greatly  outweighed  the higher  opportunity  costs  of  not  employing  chil 
dren  in  the work  force,  and  therefore  child  labor  has  declined  significantly. 
However,  in urban  areas,  where  families  are only  rice  consumers,  the effects 
of  the rice  exports  on  price  has  led  to  increases  in child  labor  since  urban 
incomes  have  declined.  Since  Vietnam  is predominantly  rural,  the overall 
effect  has  been  a decline  in child  labor. But  given  the  trend  toward  massive 
urbanization  in  most  developing  countries,  this  study  illustrates  the potential 
for  increased  exports  (particularly  in agricultural  commodities)  to  lead  to 
higher  net  rates  of  child  labor,  absent  any  forms  of  government  intervention. 
Maskus  finds  no  empirical  evidence  to  suggest  that  a  lack  of  interna 
tional  standards  has  led  to  significant  erosion  of  low-skilled  wages  in devel 
8. Edmonds  and  Pavcnik  (2001). 54  Brooking  s Trade  Forum:  2003 
oped  countries,  or  is a  significant  determinant  of  trade performance  and  for 
eign  direct  investment  throughout  the  developing  world.9  Maskus  also 
reports  evidence  regarding  the  impact  of  labor  standards  on wages  in export 
processing  zones.  He  claims  that overall  the  zones  pay  higher  wages  and 
have  better  working  conditions,  but  that  in  some  countries  the minimum 
wage  is  less  likely  to be  enforced  in export  processing  zones  than  in  the  rest 
of  the  country.  Anecdotal  evidence  also  suggests  that  efforts  to organize 
workers  in export  processing  zones  have  been  routinely  suppressed.  Maskus 
points  out  that  the altruistic  reasons  echoed  in  much  of  the developed  world 
for  promoting  labor  standards,  even  if  sincere,  are  often  used  as  a guise  for 
trade  protectionism  and  that  natural  variability  in  labor  standards  is  an 
inevitable  result  of  differing  levels  of  economic,  social,  and  cultural  devel 
opment. 
Maskus  analyzes  the  extent  to which  trade  instruments  such  as  tariffs, 
import  quotas,  and  sanctions  could  potentially  be  used  to enforce  interna 
tional  compliance  with  a minimum  set of  core  labor  standards,  specifically 
with  respect  to developing  countries.  He  finds  that  trade  instruments  are 
never  first  best  and  that often  they  exacerbate  the problems  they  are meant 
to  solve  (primarily  because  they  often  reduce  the  poorest  workers' 
incomes).  In addition,  they  can  lead  to other  labor market  distortions  that 
decrease  overall  world  welfare.  He  suggests  a  number  of more  targeted 
approaches  to address  contentious  labor  issues  such  as  child  labor,  including 
labeling  schemes  as well  as  aid  programs  focused  on  education  and  poverty 
alleviation. 
Finally,  Elliott  has  implied  in a  series  of  persuasive  articles  that  the con 
frontational  approach  of  proglobalizers  and  antiglobalizing  activists  in  the 
1990s  should  be  discarded.10  She  also  argues  that many  efforts  to protect 
worker  rights  are  not  thinly  veiled  protectionist  actions,  but  in fact  are  sin 
cerely  motivated.  As  proof,  she  analyzes  the pattern  of  countries  sanctioned 
under  the U.S.  GSP  for  not  protecting  worker  rights.11  It is  likely  that glob 
alization's  current  pace  cannot  be  sustained  unless  it is  made  clear  that glob 
alization  benefits  all  the workers,  not  just  a chosen  few. Approaches  need  to 
be  developed  that allow  globalization  to proceed,  but  at  the  same  time  pro 
tect  the rights  of workers. 
9. Maskus  (1996). 
10.  Elliott  (1998b and 2000). 
11.  Elliott  (1998a). Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  55 
Estimation  Framework 
One  of  the  earliest  papers  that  explicitly  modeled  a  firm's  decision 
whether  to  comply  with  a minimum  wage  is Ashenfelter  and  Smith.12  It 
shows  that a profit-maximizing  employer  will  choose  not  to comply  with  a 
minimum  wage  if  the gains  from  disobeying  the  law  outweigh  the potential 
costs  from  noncompliance.  If an  employer  faces  a probability  p  of  being 
caught  and  incurs  a penalty  F,  then  it can  be  shown  that  firms  will  comply 
with  minimum  wage  legislation  if 
GIL  -(M-w)  +  (l/2w)[M 
- 
w]2e  >  0,  (1) 
where  G  is a  function  of  the probability  of  detection  p  and  the penalty,  F;  L 
is  the number  of  employees  in  the  firm; M  is  the minimum  wage;  w  is  the 
average  wage  paid  by  the  firm;  and  e  is  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  labor 
and  is  less  than zero. 
If one  simplifies  the  analysis  and  sets  the  elasticity  of  labor  demand 
equal  to zero,  then  firms  would  comply  with  minimum  wage  legislation  if 
the expected  penalty  from  violating  the  law, given  by GIL,  exceeds  the addi 
tional  compensation,  given  by  the difference  M-w,  that needs  to be  paid  to 
each  employee  when  the  firm  complies  with  the minimum  wage.  As  indi 
cated  by  equation  1, firms  are more  likely  to comply  with  minimum  wage 
legislation  if  the probability  of  detection  or  penalty  is high,  if  the minimum 
wage  M  is  low,  or  if  the  firm  pays  high  wages.  Since  a  large  number  of 
employees  reduces  the  per  employee  cost  of  compliance  in  terms  of  the 
penalty  F  per worker,  large  firms  are  also  less  likely  to comply,  after  con 
trolling  for  the probability  of  detection  and  other  factors. 
Equation  1 suggests  that one  can  set up  an  indicator  variable: 
Xit 
=  1 if GIL  - 
(M 
- 
w)  +  ( 1/2w)[M 
- 
w]2e  >  0, 
=  0  if GIL  -(M-w)  +  ( l/2w)[M 
- 
w]2e  <  or  equal  to 0.  (2) 
This  will  be  estimated  using  a probit  specification.  Estimating  equation  2 
requires  information  on  minimum  wages;  the wage,  w,  that would  have 
been  paid  in  the  absence  of minimum  wage  regulations;  employment,  L; 
and measures  of  the probability  of  compliance  and  penalties  associated  with 
noncompliance.  One  also  needs  to control  for  differences  in  types  of work 
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ers. Minimum  wages  in  Indonesia  vary  across  districts  (indexed  by  r)  and 
over  time  (indexed  by  t). These  are  available  from  the government  and  are 
reported  in appendix  table A-l.  Since  w  is  the wage  that would  have  pre 
vailed  in  the  absence  of  minimum  wage  legislation,  w  is  normally  not 
observed.  However,  in  the  Indonesian  case,  around  half  of  all  firms  do  not 
comply  with  the minimum  wage.  Consequently,  w  is defined  as  the average 
wage  in region  r at  time  t across  all  firms  that do  not  comply  with  the mini 
mum  wage.  However,  w  is probably  a  (downward-biased)  measure  of  the 
true w,  since  presumably  firms  that  face  a higher  gap  between  w  and M  are 
those most  likely  to violate  the  law. 
For  Indonesia,  there  is no  existing  evidence  on  the probability  of  detec 
tion.  It also  appears  that  for  domestic  firms,  the penalty,  F,  for  noncompli 
ance  is probably  close  to zero.13  However,  for  exporting  or multinational 
firms,  the costs  of  noncompliance  could  be  quite  large  due  to external  pres 
sure.  It  is also  likely  that  the  probability  of  detection  has  increased  over 
time,  as watchdog  activists  and  antisweatshop  organizations  have  increased 
vigilance  over  multinational  activities  in  developing  countries  such  as 
Indonesia.  Consequently,  we  will  focus  primarily  on  F  as  a  function  of 
export  status  and multinational  status.  The  setup  also  suggests  that compli 
ance  should  vary  inversely  with  size. We  will  also  control  for  size  in  the 
estimation. 
According  to equation  1, compliance  should  increase  with  the wage  w 
paid  by  the  firm  in  the  absence  of  a minimum  wage,  and  should  fall  as M 
rises. We  can  test  this  directly.  The  framework  also  suggests  that  compli 
ance  will  rise  as  the probability  of  detection  and  penalties  for  noncompli 
ance  increase. We  will  test  this by  examining  first  whether  firms  with  global 
contacts  are more  likely  to  comply,  and  second  whether  compliance  has 
increased  over  time  as  the  probability  of  detection  has  increased  and  the 
penalties  associated  with  noncompliance  have  also  increased.  Consequently, 
we  will  estimate  the following: 
Xirt 
= 
ocj +  OL2Mrt  +  a3w/t  +  a4DF//  +  ol5EXP? 
+ a6SIZEirt_x  + a7Z/rM  + Dt  +  cor  +  eiv  (3) 
The  dependent  variable  is a zero-one  variable,  which  indicates  whether  firm 
i in  region  r at  time  t pays  at or  above  the minimum  wage.  To  address  the 
13.  In  Indonesia  in  the mid-1990s,  the fine  for  noncompliance  was  equivalent  to $50,  not 
a  large  amount  for most  enterprises.  See  Rama  (1996). Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  57 
possibility  of  endogeneity  bias,  we  will  regress  current  compliance  on 
lagged  firm  characteristics.  The  independent  variables  include  export  status, 
EXP,  and  foreign  ownership,  FOR.  EXP  and  FOR  will  both  be  defined 
based  on  averages  over  the entire  period.  We  set FOR  equal  to one  if  mean 
foreign  ownership  over  the whole  sample  period  is equal  to or  greater  than 
0.1  (10  percent).  We  set EXP  equal  to one  if mean  export  share  over  the 
whole  period  is greater  than  0.2  (20  percent).  In an  earlier  version  of  this 
paper,  we  defined  EXP  and FOR  as  continuous  variables  varying  between 
zero  and  100  percent.  The  previous  version  of  the  paper  identified  the 
impact  of  ownership  and  export  status  based  on  annual  changes  in EXP  and 
FOR,  which  is potentially  problematic  due  to  reverse  causation.  However, 
our  current  approach  is  less  likely  to  lead  to  spurious  results,  since  small 
changes  in ownership  or  export  orientation  are more  likely  to be  due  to 
measurement  error  or  changes  in  compliance  itself.  Nevertheless,  both 
approaches  yield  very  similar  results.  The  vector  Z  includes  a number  of 
factors  that could  be  correlated  with  FOR  and EXP  and  are  likely  to affect 
X.  This  includes  worker  characteristics  and  other  firm  characteristics  such  as 
capital  intensity.  As  indicated  in figure  1, compliance  is a much  more  seri 
ous  problem  for  production  workers.  Consequently  equation  3 will  be  esti 
mated  separately  for production  and  nonproduction  workers.  Some  years  in 
the  survey  include  additional  information  on  employee  education  and  expe 
rience.  When  available,  these  will  also  be  included.  Estimation  will  also 
include  dummy  variables  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  of  region-, 
time-,  and  industry-specific  effects,  captured  in equation  3 by  cor  and Dv 
Why  should  greater  international  competition  negatively  affect  compli 
ance  with  labor  standards?  In an  imperfectly  competitive  framework,  it  is 
easy  to  show  that maximizing  firm  profits  with  respect  to employment  leads 
to a first  order  condition  where  wages  are  a positive  function  of  final  goods' 
prices.  If domestic  markets  no  longer  are  protected  from  foreign  competi 
tion,  international  prices  (which  may  be  lower  than domestic  prices)  could 
put  downward  pressure  on wages  (w  in equations  1 and  2)  and  consequently 
lead  to  lower  compliance  with  the minimum  wage.  If  there  is  imperfect 
competition,  footloose  foreign  firms  may  be more  likely  to appropriate  rents 
relative  to domestic  enterprises.  On  the other  hand,  it is equally  possible  that 
exporters  and multinational  firms  are more  likely  to comply  with  domestic 
labor  standards.  In  the  1990s  pressure  from  international  human  rights 
activists  led  a number  of  enterprises  to be more  careful  about  compliance 
with  domestic  labor  standards.  One  major  motivating  factor was  to avoid  the 58  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
Figure  4. Articles  about  Indonesia  and  Sweatshops  or  Child  Labor 
in  Major  Newspapers,  1990-99 
Source:  LexisNexis. 
kind  of  negative  publicity  encountered  by  firms  like Nike.  In  the  framework 
above,  this  suggests  that exporters  and multinationals  face  both  a higher/?? 
the  probability  of  detection?and  higher  penalty  F.  The  higher  p  results 
from  the  additional  scrutiny  placed  on  these  firms  in  the  1990s,  while  the 
higher  penalty  F  is indicative  of  the greater  costs  to  multinationals  of  acquir 
ing a negative  reputation  with  respect  to compliance  with  labor  standards. 
To  the  extent  that antisweatshop  activism  in  the  1990s  affected  multina 
tional  and  exporter  behavior,  we  would  expect  exporters  and multinationals 
to  increase  compliance  over  time.  Figure  4  shows  that  the number  of  news 
paper  articles  that  have  highlighted  sweatshop  or  child  labor  activities  in 
Indonesia  has multiplied.  This  suggests  that  both  F  and  p  have  probably 
increased. 
If compliance  has  increased,  this  suggests  a modified  version  of  equa 
tion  3: 
Xirt 
= 
ax  +  CL2Mn  +  a3wrt  +  a4DF//  + a5EXPi  +  a6SIZEirt_{ 
+  vjZirt_x  + afifDFIi  + a2D,*EXP,  + Dt  +  cor  +  eit.  (4) Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  59 
Activism  was  also  concentrated  in key  sectors  such  as  textiles  and  apparel. 
Consequently,  we  analyze  whether  compliance  rates  for multinationals  vary 
across  sectors.  To  the  extent  that  activism  may  have  led  to higher  compli 
ance  rates  for  some  multinationals  in certain  sectors,  we  would  also  expect 
differential  effects  on  production  worker  employment.  An  examination  of 
how  differential  compliance  may  have  affected  employment  follows. 
Compliance  in  Indonesia 
The  data  for  this  analysis  comes  from  the  annual  manufacturing  survey 
of  Indonesia  collected  and  compiled  by  the  Indonesian  government's  statis 
tical  agency,  Badan  Pusat  Statisdik  (BPS).  The  completion  of  this  survey  is 
mandatory  under  Indonesian  law. Therefore  the data  captures  the entire  pop 
ulation  of  Indonesian  manufacturing  firms,  which  ranged  from  approxi 
mately  13,000  in  1990  to more  than  18,000  in  1999.  The  survey  includes 
over  400  questions  in any  given  year,  the  large majority  of  which  remain 
constant,  although  in certain  periods  additional  questions  are  included  and 
others  removed.  Over  the  ten-year  period,  there  is an  average  of  4.5  obser 
vations  per  firm,  reflecting  the  fact  that  some  firms  go  out  of  business,  while 
others  enter. 
There  are  two  obvious  sources  of measurement  error  in the data.  The  first 
is human  error  in either  completing  the  questionnaire  or  reading  the data 
from  it.  A  fairly  significant  percentage  of  the observations  include  nonsensi 
cal  entries  such  as  a negative  number  of workers,  negative  age  of  the  firm, 
or  zero  level  of  output.  These  observations  were  dropped.  This  could  poten 
tially  bias  the  results  if  they were  systematic,  but  an  inspection  of  the data 
revealed  no  underlying  patterns  in the erroneous  values. 
Another  potential  source  of measurement  error  is  the  inclusion  of  pur 
posefully  untruthful  information.  Given  that  Indonesia  has minimum  wage 
laws,  there would  appear  to be  an  incentive  for firms  to exaggerate  wages  in 
order  to feign  compliance.  However,  whether  due  to  ignorance  of  these  laws 
or  a  lack  of  enforcement,  a very  large  percentage  of  firms  reported  wages 
significantly  below  the minimum  for  a number  of  years.  These  compliance 
estimates  are  consistent  with  other  studies  that examine  compliance  with  the 
minimum  wage  in  Indonesia,  including  those  by  the  Indonesian  SMERU 
Research  Institute  and Alatas  and Cameron.14  These  studies,  based  on  both 
14.  SMERU  Research  Institute  (2001)  and Alatas  and  Cameron  (2003). 60  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
worker  surveys  and  the  Indonesian  Labor  Force  Survey  (Sakernas),  indicate 
that  "a  sizable  portion  of  the  sample  is  receiving  less  than  the minimum 
wage."15  The  SMERU  Research  Institute  analyzed  compliance  rates  with 
the minimum  wage  in  Indonesia  using  a  sample  of  forty  firms  that  reported 
worker-specific  wages  within  each  firm,  as well  as  the national  labor  force 
survey.  They  found  compliance  rates  of  about  70  percent,  comparable  to 
those  reported  in figure  1.  Alatas  and  Cameron  report  the  kernel  density 
estimates  of  the monthly  wage  distribution  for West  Java  and  Jakarta.16 
These  figures,  based  on  the  individual-level  surveys,  also  imply  rates  of 
noncompliance  as  high  as  40  percent.  These  high  levels  of  noncompliance 
are  likely  to be  accurate,  since  individual  households  have  no  incentive  to 
misreport  their  earnings  for  the  labor  force  surveys.  Using  plant-level  data 
for Morocco,  Harrison  and  Currie  also  find  self-reported  noncompliance 
rates  of  up  to 50  percent  in  Morocco,  presumably  due  to a  lack  of  enforce 
ment  or  fear  of  penalties  as well.17  These  other  studies,  many  of  them  also 
on  Indonesia,  suggest  the high  rates  of  noncompliance  with  the minimum 
wage  reported  in figure  1 are  likely  to be  accurate. 
We  begin  by  identifying  broad  trends  in minimum  wage  compliance  in 
Indonesia,  focusing  on  the period  from  1990  through  1999. We  focus  on  this 
period  because  information  on  export  orientation  was  not  collected  before 
1990,  and  information  on worker  characteristics  is only  available  during  the 
mid-1990s.  Using  the manufacturing  census  plant-level  data  for  Indonesia, 
we  calculated  average  production  and  nonproduction  worker  wages  relative 
to  the  statutory  minimum  from  1990  through  1999.  Since  the minimum 
wage  is  supposed  to apply  only  to base  wages,  we  computed  compliance  as 
the plant's  average  wage  for  production  and  nonproduction  workers  sepa 
rately,  compared  to  the minimum  wage  as  defined  in appendix  table A-l. 
The  plant's  average  wage  is defined  as  basic  compensation  (salary)  divided 
by  the number  of workers  in that  skill  category.  As  indicated  by  the  trends  in 
figure  2,  the  ratio  of  production  worker  wages  to  the minimum  wage  fell 
from  a  factor  of  two  to  one,  indicating  that  average  production  worker 
wages  are  now  hovering  just  above  the minimum  wage. 
Figure  5  shows  the percentage  of  domestic  firms  that complied  with  the 
minimum  wage  during  the  1990s. As  indicated  in figure  5,  the percentage  of 
15. Alatas  and  Cameron  (2003,  p.  16). 
16. Alatas  and  Cameron  (2003). 
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Figure  5.  Domestic  Firm  Compliance  with  Minimum  Wage  Laws,  Indonesia,  1990-99 
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Source:  Budan Pusat Statisdik. 
domestic  firms  that paid  the minimum  wage  to production  workers  ranged 
from  65  percent  in  1990  to a  low  of  less  than 40  percent  in  1995.  In the mid 
1990s,  less  than  half  of  all  domestic  enterprises  paid  an  average  wage  to 
production  workers  that exceeded  the  statutory  minimum.  Since  nonproduc 
tion workers  were  paid  a  higher  wage,  the  extent  of  compliance  with  the 
minimum  wage  for  nonproduction  workers  is  significantly  greater.  Compli 
ance  with  the minimum  wage  for  nonproduction  ranged  from  a  low  of  75 
percent  in  the mid-1990s  to a high  of  nearly  90  percent  in  1990. Neverthe 
less,  a  large  fraction  of  domestically  owned  enterprises  failed  to pay  average 
wages  above  the  statutory  minimum. 
Figure  6  compares  compliance  with  minimum  wage  laws  for  firms  with 
and without  foreign  ownership.  Panel  a of  figure  6  reports  compliance  rates 
for  production  workers,  while  the bottom  portion  reports  compliance  for 
nonproduction  workers.  A  remarkable  difference  in compliance  rates  across 
both  sets  of  enterprises  is demonstrated,  although  the differences  are much 
larger  for  (the  lesser  paid)  production  workers.  Compliance  rates  for  foreign 
firms  during  the mid-1990s  were  nearly  double  those  for  domestic  enter 62  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
Figure  6.  Firm  Compliance  with  Minimum  Wage  Laws,  Based  on  Domestic  or  Foreign 
Ownership,  Indonesia,  1990-99 
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prises.  While  less  than  40  percent  of  domestically  owned  enterprises  paid 
production  workers  average  wages  that  exceeded  the minimum  wage  in 
1995,  70  percent  of  foreign  firms  did  so. At  the beginning  of  the  decade, 
almost  90  percent  of  all  foreign  enterprises  paid  average  wages  that equaled 
or  exceeded  the  statutory  minimum.  While  compliance  rates  fell  in  the mid 
1990s,  by  1999 more  than  80  percent  of  foreign  enterprises  paid  wages  that 
exceeded  or  equaled  the  statutory  minimum  for  production  workers.  The 
results  for  nonproduction  workers  (panel  b)  are  similar,  but  the differences 
are  less  dramatic.  Over  all  years,  foreign  enterprises  were  significantly  more 
likely  to comply  with  the  statutory  minimum  wage,  with  90  percent  of  all 
enterprises  paying  average  wages  to nonproduction  workers  that equaled  or 
exceeded  the minimum  wage.  For  domestic  enterprises,  the  rate  of  compli 
ance  is  lower:  compliance  ranged  from  70  percent  in  1995  to  slightly  over 
90  percent  in  1990. 
Figure  7  compares  the  extent  of  minimum  wage  compliance  across 
domestic  plants  that exported  a percentage  of  their  sales  abroad  versus  those 
oriented  toward  the  domestic  market.  Over  the  entire  time  period  the per 
centage  of  domestic  exporters  that complied  with  the minimum  wage  laws 
for production  workers  was  consistently  fifteen  to  twenty  points  higher  than 
for  domestic  plants  that only  produced  for  the  domestic  market  (panel  a). 
The  results  for nonproduction  workers  are  also  similar,  but  less  pronounced 
(panel  b). Again,  exporting  firms  were  significantly  more  likely  to comply 
with  minimum  wage  legislation  than  firms  oriented  toward  the  domestic 
market. 
These  broad  trends  appear  to  suggest  that multinationals  and  other  firms 
exposed  to  international  competition  are more  likely  to comply  with  mini 
mum  wage  legislation.  These  trends  also  suggest  that compliance  with  mini 
mum  wage  legislation  has  increased  over  time,  particularly  for  firms  faced 
with  international  competition.  The  more  formal  results,  presented  below, 
confirm  the  trends  outlined  in  these  figures. 
Estimation  Results 
The  first  set of  econometric  results  is presented  in  table  1.  We  begin  with 
the  results  for  production  workers,  who  are  considered  (an  imperfect  proxy 
for)  unskilled  workers.  Rather  than  report  the  coefficients  derived  from  the 
maximum  likelihood  estimation,  we  report  the  implied  change  in  the proba 
bility  of  compliance  due  to a marginal  change  in  the  independent  variable. 64  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
Figure  7. Domestic  Firm  Compliance  with  Minimum  Wage  Laws,  Based  on  Export 
Status,  Indonesia,  1990-99 
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Source:  Sudan Pusat Statisdik. Table  1. Probit  Results  for  Dependent  Variable  Pay  Minimum  Wagea 
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Significant at the 5 percent level; ** 
significant at the 1  percent level. 
a. Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
b. Log number  of male and female employees by educational  category (no school, some primary,  junior  high, senior  high, and college). 
c. Capital inputs,  materials, prices, and technology  expenditures. 
d. Province dummies, ISIC  dummies, and year dummies. 66  Brooking  s Trade  Forum:  2003 
At  the  sample  mean,  the predicted  probability  of  compliance  with  the mini 
mum  wage  is 49  percent  for production  workers  and  80  percent  for  nonpro 
duction  workers.  As  indicated  by  the  earlier  figures,  compliance  is much 
more  of  a problem  for production  workers. 
As  expected,  a higher  minimum  wage  results  in  lower  compliance.  The 
implied  probability,  -0.738,  suggests  that  a  1 percent  increase  in  the man 
dated  minimum  wage  at  the  sample  mean  would  lower  compliance  by 
0.7  percent.  Higher  wages  in  the  absence  of minimum  wage  legislation, 
captured  by  the  average  wage  for  noncomplying  firms,  also  lead  to higher 
compliance.  As  expected,  if  the wage  that would  have  been  paid  in  the 
absence  of minimum  wages  is higher,  then  the costs  of  complying  with  the 
legislation  are  lower  and  compliance  is more  likely.  The  point  estimate  sug 
gests  that a  10 percent  increase  in  the wage  that would  have  been  paid  in  the 
absence  of  the minimum  would  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  probability  of 
compliance  of  almost  3 percent.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the broad 
trends  outlined  earlier,  where  we  saw  an  increase  in  the  statutory  minimum 
wage  in  the earlier  part  of  the decade  accompanied  by  a  fall  in compliance. 
Following  the  1997  crisis  (when  the  rate of  inflation  soared),  the  real  value 
of  the minimum  wage  declined  and  the  real  value  of  the  alternative  wage 
rose.  Both  trends were  accompanied  by  an  increase  in compliance. 
The  coefficients  on DFI  and  EXP  indicate  that  exporting  plants  and 
plants  with  foreign  equity  participation  are more  likely  to comply  with  min 
imum wage  legislation.  The  point  estimate  on DFI  suggests  that  if a foreign 
owner  were  to  take  over  a domestic  enterprise,  compliance  with  minimum 
wage  legislation  would  increase  by  20  percent.  The  coefficient  on  export 
status  suggests  that an  exporting  plant  is 6  percent  more  likely  to comply 
with  minimum  wage  legislation  than a nonexporter.  The  only  variable  that  is 
not  consistent  with  expectations  is SIZE.  Larger  plants  are more  likely  to 
comply  with  minimum  wage  legislation.  Size,  however,  is a proxy  for many 
other  factors,  which  are  included  later  in  the analysis. 
The  fourth  column  of  table  1 examines  the determinants  of  compliance 
with  minimum  wage  legislation  for  nonproduction  workers.  The  results  are 
similar,  but  the  importance  of  factors  such  as minimum  wages,  alternative 
wages,  and  plant-level  characteristics  are  less  significant.  This  is  in part 
because  nonproduction  workers  are  generally  higher  skilled  workers  and 
wage  determination  is  less  likely  to be  affected  by minimum  wage  legisla 
tion. The  results  suggest  that  foreign  ownership  would  result  in a 7 percent Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  67 
higher  probability  of  compliance  with  minimum  wages  for  these  types  of 
workers.  For  exporters,  the probability  is 6 percent  higher. 
The  second  and fifth  columns  of  table  1 add  details  on  educational  attain 
ment  for  employees  at  the  individual  plant. However,  the  sample  is restricted 
to the years  1996  through  1998,  the only  three years  during  which  the  survey 
included  questions  regarding  the educational  attainment  of  the plant's  labor 
force.18  Although  not  shown,  the  results  suggest  that  as  the  share  of more 
educated  workers  in  the plant  rises,  the probability  of  compliance  with  the 
minimum  wage  also  rises.  Even  for women,  who  are  significantly  less  likely 
to receive  the minimum  wage  no matter  their education  level,  the probability 
that  they will  receive  at  least  the minimum  wage  rises  as  their  educational 
attainment  rises.  The  addition  of  controls  for educational  attainment  does  not 
affect  the magnitude  or  the  significance  of  the  coefficients  on DFI  or EXP, 
which  remain  positive  and  statistically  significant. 
The  third  and  sixth  columns  in  table  1  restrict  the  analysis  to  1996 
through  1998,  but  include  additional  plant-level  controls.  Plant-level  con 
trols  include  the  logs  of  real material  inputs,  real  value  of  the  reported  capi 
tal  stock,  the  average  wages  for  production  and  nonproduction  workers  in 
the  region,  the  output  price  for  that  four-digit  sector,  and  investment  in 
machinery  at  the  plant  level.  If we  include  these  additional  controls,  the 
coefficient  on FOR  in  the production  worker  specification  is cut  in half,  but 
remains  statistically  significant  and  positive.  The  coefficient  on EXP  for 
production  workers  becomes  statistically  significant  and  negative.  In col 
umn  6, which  reports  the  results  for  nonproduction  workers,  both  DFI  and 
EXP  become  small  in magnitude  and  statistically  insignificant.  Why?  Both 
DFI  and EXP  are  highly  correlated  with  capital  stock.  In previous  regres 
sions,  ownership  and  trade  orientation  were  significant  partly  because  they 
are  a proxy  for  capital  intensity.  The  results  in columns  3  and  6  provide  an 
explanation  for why  multinationals  and  exporters  are more  likely  to pay  the 
minimum  wage:  they  are more  capital-intensive,  highly  productive  enter 
prises  whose  workers  are more  highly  paid. 
The  fact  that  the  coefficient  on  EXP  switches  signs,  from  significantly 
positive  to  significantly  negative,  is worth  discussion.  Without  plant  con 
trols, we  find  that exporting  enterprises  are more  likely  to comply  with  min 
18. The  education  variables  are  only  available  for  1995-97,  but  because  we  use  lags,  the 
years  in  the  estimation  are  1996-98. 68  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
imum  wage  legislation.  These  results  confirm  what  we  find  in  the  graphs. 
Without  controlling  for  plant  characteristics,  we  find  that  these  firms  are 
more  likely  to comply  with  minimum  wage  legislation.  However,  once  we 
control  for  plant  characteristics,  we  find  less  compliance  among  exporters. 
In other  words,  among  plants  with  the  same  characteristics  in  terms  of  capi 
tal  intensity,  technology,  and  so on,  exporters  are  less  likely  to comply.  This 
result  is consistent  with  the  idea  that  international  competition  forces  firms 
to  cut  wages. 
Table  2  reports  the  results  of  estimating  equation  4,  where  we  allow  the 
coefficient  on DFI  and EXP  to vary  over  time. The  basic  results,  reported  in 
columns  1 and  4  for  production  and  nonproduction  workers,  are  generally 
consistent  with  the earlier  specification.  However,  the only  coefficient  that 
appears  to vary  as  a  function  of  time  is  the  coefficient  on  export  status  for 
production  workers.  The  coefficient  on EXP*t  indicates  that  the probability 
of  compliance  with  minimum  wage  legislation  increased  by  almost  half  a 
percent  a year.  This  result  is  robust  across  specifications.  The  evidence  for 
Indonesia  suggests  a  strong  increase  in compliance  with  minimum  wage 
legislation  for  exporting  plants. 
If we  restrict  the  sample  to  the  three years  that  report worker  characteris 
tics,  the  results  are  similar  and  even  more  pronounced.  The  implied  proba 
bilities  are  reported  in columns  2  and  4  of  table  2. Again,  the  results  suggest 
that  there  is no  clear  trend  in compliance  over  time  for  foreign  enterprises, 
but  that exporters  became  more  likely  to pay minimum  wages  to  their pro 
duction  workers  over  the  sample  period.  During  those  three  years,  during 
the  peak  of  antisweatshop  activism,  the  likelihood  of  compliance  for 
exporters  increased  by  about  4  percentage  points  a year. 
The  third and  sixth  columns  of  table  2  include  additional  plant-level  con 
trols. As  in  table  1, the addition  of  plant  controls  reduces  the magnitude  and 
statistical  significance  of  the coefficients  on EXP  and DFL  Again,  it appears 
that  the  factors  driving  the  higher  compliance  of  foreign  and  exporting 
plants  with  minimum  wage  laws  are  their  higher  productivity  and  capital 
intensity.  In  the early  part  of  the  1990s,  there  is a marked  difference  between 
the degree  of  compliance  across  exporters  and  nonexporters:  the coefficient 
on EXP  suggests  that exporting  firms  were  12 percentage  points  more  likely 
to  fail  to comply  with  the minimum  wage,  compared  to other  firms  with 
similar  characteristics.  However,  over  time  the  rate  of  compliance  among 
exporters  increased  faster  than  among  nonexporters,  resulting  in a higher 
probability  of  compliance  by  the end  of  the decade. Table  2.  Probit  Results  for  Dependent  Variable  Pay  Minimum  Wage,  with  Interaction  Terms11 
Production  workers  Nonproduction  workers 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Log  Minwage 
Log  Nominwage 
Foreign  (-1) 
Exports  (-1) 
F0#*year  (-1) 
?XP*year  (-1) 
SIZE(-l) 
Worker  controls 
Plant  controls 
Dummies  (all) 
Period 























































































































Significant at the 1  percent level. 
a. Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  See also notes to table 1. 70  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
Much  of  the  debate  over  labor  standards  has  focused  on  certain  key 
industries.  In particular,  much  of  the  attention  has  focused  on  sweatshop 
activities  such  as  textiles  and  apparel.  In  table  3 we  restrict  the  sample  to 
textiles,  apparel,  and  footwear.  An  additional  benefit  of  restricting  the  sam 
ple  to  these  three  sectors  is  that  the employees  in  these  industries  are  likely 
to be more  homogeneous  in quality,  further  limiting  the  scope  for  hetero 
geneity  in the  labor  force. 
The  results  reported  in  table  3  are  similar  to  those  presented  in  tables  1 
and  2. The  first  and  fifth  columns  of  table  3  indicate  that  a  100  percent 
increase  in foreign  ownership  or  export  orientation  would  increase  the prob 
ability  of  compliance  with  minimum  wages  by  12-14  percent  for  produc 
tion workers  and  6-8  percent  for  nonproduction  workers.  If we  add worker 
characteristics,  the  results  are  generally  unaffected,  as  reported  in columns  2 
and  6  of  table  3. Allowing  the coefficient  on EXP  and DFI  to vary  over  time 
(columns  4  and  8)  also  leads  to  results  that  are  almost  identical  with  the 
larger  sample.  The  evidence  suggests  a  significant  increase  in minimum 
wage  compliance  for  exporters  in  the  1990s  with  respect  to production 
workers,  rising  by  almost  2 percent  a year. 
Although  similar  to  tables  1 and  2,  there  is one  result  in  table  3  that  is 
quite  striking:  the  size  of  the  compliance  effect  for  exporters.  Exporters  in 
these  sectors  are  significantly  more  likely  to comply  with  minimum  wage 
legislation.  This  is  true even  if we  add  plant-level  controls  to  the  specifica 
tion.  In  addition,  exporters  in  this  sector  are  increasing  compliance  over 
time  twice  as  quickly  as  exporters  in other  sectors.  The  results  in  table  3 
suggest  that  these  sectors  are  indeed  different.  Whether  these  differences 
stem  from  human  rights  activism  and  international  pressure  remains  a  topic 
for  future  research. 
Extensions,  Robustness  Tests,  Employment  Effects 
This  section  discusses  a  number  of  additional  results.  If  the  analysis 
departs  from  the  probit  framework  outlined  above  and  estimates  a  linear 
probability  model,  the  results  are  similar  to  those  reported  here.  Alternative 
specifications,  which  introduce  plant  fixed  effects  and  allow  for  the  endo 
geneity  of  foreign  ownership  and  export  status,  yield  similar  results.  Instru 
ments  used  for  this  analysis  include  the  number  of  other  foreign  firms  or 
exporters  in  the  same  location,  as well  as market  size  in  the  region  and 
industry.  Previous  studies  suggest  that  two  of  the major  determinants  of  for Table  3.  Probit  Results  for  Dependent  Variable  Pay  Minimum  Wage,  Textile,  Apparel,  and  Footwear  Sectors  Only8 
Production  workers  Nonproduction  workers 
Variable  a)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Log  Minwage 
Log  Nominwage 
Foreign  (-1) 




Worker  controls 
Plant  controls 
Dummies  (all) 
Years 







































































































































Significant at the  5 percent level; ** 
significant at the 1  percent level, 
a. Standard  errors  are in  parentheses. See also notes to table 1. 72  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
eign  investment  and  export  status  are  the  size  of  the domestic  market  and 
agglomeration  effects  due  to  the presence  of  other  enterprises.19  The  results 
are  qualitatively  similar  to  those  reported  here.  Harrison  and  Scorse  also 
explore  the  implications  of  labor  standards  for  employment  and  the plant's 
exit  decision.20  They  also  analyze  whether  increasing  foreign  competition, 
as  proxied  by  foreign  market  share,  has  driven  domestic  firms  to  reduce 
compliance  with  labor  standards. 
In  this  section,  we  focus  on  two  important  considerations:  other  possible 
explanations  for  the  increase  in  minimum  wage  compliance  for exporters  in 
the  1990s,  and  the consequences  for  employment  of  higher  minimum  wage 
compliance  among  exporters  and multinational  plants.  There  are  several 
alternative  explanations  for  the  increase  in compliance  among  exporters. 
First,  exporters  may  have  experienced  a rise  in profitability  relative  to other 
firms,  particularly  in  light  of  the currency  crisis  that  led  to a  large  devalua 
tion  of  the  currency  and  consequently  improved  the  competitiveness  of 
exporting  enterprises.  Second,  exporters  may  have  self-selected  into  export 
ing on  the basis  of  higher  profitability  or  higher  productivity.  Previous  stud 
ies  suggest  that  the more  productive  enterprises  are most  likely  to export. 
Consequently,  we  redo  the analysis,  controlling  for  plant-level  profitability 
and  plant-level  productivity  growth,  using  total  factor  productivity  growth 
(TFPG)  as  our measure  of  productivity.  We  also  explore  the  consequences 
of  redefining  worker  compensation  to  include  in-kind  payments.  Minimum 
wage  regulations  provide  that up  to 25  percent  of  the wage  may  be  provided 
in  the  form  of  permanent  in-kind  benefits  such  as  food,  lodging,  or  trans 
portation.  Although  the majority  of  formal  sector  enterprises  ignore  this pro 
vision  and  interpret  the minimum  wage  law  as  applying  strictly  to  regular 
cash  compensation,  a number  of  the  smaller  enterprises  may  include  in-kind 
payments  in  the wage  bundle  in an  effort  to  comply  with  the minimum 
wage. 
The  results  are  reported  in  table  4.  The  coefficients  on  both  plant-level 
profitability  and TFPG,  though  not  reported  in  table  4,  are  positive  and  sig 
nificant.  Plants  with  higher  profitability  or  higher  productivity  growth 
exhibit  higher  compliance  rates with  minimum  wage  legislation.  However, 
the  addition  of  these  controls  does  not  alter  the original  results.  The  coeffi 
19.  See  Aitken,  Hanson,  and  Harrison  (1997)  and  Eskeland  and  Harrison  (2003). 
20.  Harrison  and  Scorse  (2003). Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  73 
cient  on  foreign  investment  continues  to be  positive  and  significant,  even 
with  the  addition  of  plant  and worker  controls.  For  foreign  investment,  the 
interaction  with  time  continues  to be  insignificant,  indicating  no  changes  in 
compliance  during  the  1990s.  As  before,  the  coefficient  on  export  status 
turns negative  and  significant  with  the  addition  of worker  and  plant  charac 
teristics.  The  coefficient  on  export  status  interacted  with  time  is  significant 
and  positive,  indicating  an  increase  in  compliance  during  the  1990s  for 
exporters.  These  results  control  for  increasing  profitability  and  productivity 
of  exporters,  suggesting  that  the  increase  in compliance  is not  due  to  these 
kinds  of  previously  unobserved,  time-varying  measures. 
The  bottom  half  of  table 4  replaces  the compliance  measure  with  a meas 
ure  that  includes  in-kind  payments  to workers.  As  indicated  above,  Indone 
sian  law allows  firms  to  include  a fraction  of  in-kind  payments  as part  of  so 
called  minimum  wages.  If we  add  in-kind  payments  to wages,  the  results 
are  unaffected.  The  only  difference  is  that now  the  likelihood  of  compliance 
for  foreign  enterprises  is even  greater,  suggesting  that  foreign  firms  pay  an 
even  larger  fraction  of worker  salaries  in  the  form  of  in-kind  payments  than 
other  kinds  of  enterprises. 
We  next  turn  to  an  examination  of  the  employment  effects  of  higher 
minimum  wages.  The  orthodox  approach  to minimum  wages  suggests  that 
an  increase  in mandated  wages  should  lead  to  a  fall  in employment,  as 
employers  are  driven  up  their  labor  demand  curve.  Before  the  1990s  stan 
dard  textbook  treatments  of  minimum  wages  reported  that  imposing  a 
wage  floor  would  lead  to adverse  consequences  for  employment.  However, 
a  series  of  influential  studies  published  by David  Card  and Alan  Krueger  in 
the  1990s  reopened  the  debate  on  the  employment  effects  of  minimum 
wages.21  In  their book Myth  and Measurement:  The New  Economics  of  the 
Minimum  Wage,  Card  and Krueger  argue  that  the  imposition  of  a minimum 
wage  need  not  have  negative  employment  consequences  if  there  are  imper 
fections  in  the  labor  market.  These  imperfections  include  the  following 
possibilities:  the  existence  of  monopsony  employers,  search  costs  for 
employers,  and  efficiency  wages.  If  any  of  these  three  characterize  the 
local  labor market,  an  increase  in  the minimum  wage  (or  an  increase  in 
compliance  with  the  existing  minimum  wage)  could  lead  to an  increase  in 
employment.  Card  and  Krueger  document  their  claim  with  a  series  of 
21. See Card and  Krueger (1994 and 1995). Table  4.  Probit  with  Dependent  Variable  Pay  Minimum  Wage,  Select  Results8 
Production  workers  Nonproduction  workers 
Specification  Foreign  Exports  FOR*time  EXP*time  Foreign  Exports  FOR*time  EXP*time 
1.  Without  worker  and  plant  controls, 
1990-99 
2. With  worker  controls,  1995-97 
3. With  worker  and  plant  controls, 
1995-97 
4. With  time  interactions,  1990-99 
5. With  worker  controls  and  time 
interactions,  1995-97 
6. With  worker,  plant,  and  time 
interactions,  1995-97 
7. With  TFPG  and  profit  margins, 
1990-99 
8. With  TFPG,  profit  margins,  and 
worker  controls,  1995-97 
9. With  TFPG,  profit  margins,  and 
worker  and  plant  controls,  1995-97 
10. As  7 with  time  interactions 
































































































































(.007) 12. As  9 with  time  interactions 
13. As  1  with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
14. As  2 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
15. As  3 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
16. As  4 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
17. As  5 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
18. As  6 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
19. As  7 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
20.  As  8 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
21.  As  9 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
22.  As  10 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
23.  As  11 with  wages,  including  in-kind 
payments 
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papers  that  examine  exogenous  increases  in minimum  wages  across  U.S. 
states. 
This  unorthodox  finding,  which  has  caused  an  enormous  debate  among 
labor  economists,  has  interesting  implications  for  labor market  policies  in 
developing  countries.  If policymakers  can  raise  wages  by  increasing  the 
statutory  minimum  or  encouraging  compliance  with  the existing  minimum 
without  increasing  unemployment,  then  minimum  wage  policies  could 
become  a  powerful  tool  for  combating  poverty.  This  was  precisely  the 
thinking  behind  a  1995 World  Bank  report,  which  strongly  recommended 
the  introduction  of  a national  minimum  wage  to reduce  poverty  in Trinidad 
and Tobago. 
One  consequence  of  this  debate  in  the United  States  has  been  a number 
of  new  studies  on  the  impact  of minimum  wages  on  employment  in devel 
oping  countries.  Strobl  and Walsh  examine  the  impact  of  a national  mini 
mum  wage  introduced  in Trinidad  and Tobago  in  1998;  Bell  examines  the 
impact  of  minimum  wages  in Colombia  and Mexico;  and Maloney  and 
Nunez  examine  the  impact  of minimum  wages  in  eight  Latin  American 
countries.22  Three  studies  examine  the  impact  of  the rising  minimum  wage 
on  employment  in Indonesia.23 
The  results  are mixed.  For  example,  Bell  finds  that minimum  wages  in 
Colombia  led  to employment  declines,  while  the minimum  wage  in  Mexico 
had  no  impact  on  employment.24  Strobl  and  Walsh  find  inconclusive  effects 
for Trinidad  and Tobago,  in part  because  the minimum  wage  appears  not  to 
have  been  enforced  across  both  sexes.25  All  these  studies,  using  primarily 
labor  force  data  and  in some  cases  plant-level  data,  uncover  widespread  evi 
dence  of  lack  of  compliance.  In Honduras,  for  example,  which  has  a very 
high  minimum  wage  relative  to average  wages,  the minimum  wage  appears 
to have  had  no  impact  on  the wage  distribution. 
The  most  recent  study,  by Alatas  and  Cameron,  uses  the most  sophisti 
cated  approach  in  its effort  to  identify  the  impact  of  the  rising  minimum 
wage  on  employment  in  Indonesia.26  Using  a  difference-in-difference 
approach,  the  authors  seek  to examine  whether  employment  in  the  textile 
and  apparel  sector  fell  as  a  result  of  the minimum  wage.  Following  Card 
22. Strobl and  Walsh  (2000), Bell  (1997),  Maloney  and  Nunez  (2003). 
23.  Rama  (1996),  SMERU  (2001),  and Alatas  and  Cameron  (2003). 
24. Bell  (1997). 
25. Strobl and  Walsh  (2000). 
26.  Alatas  and  Cameron  (2003). Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  77 
and  Krueger,  they  exploit  the  large  geographic  variation  in  the  rate  of 
increase  and  compare  changes  in employment  on  either  side  of  the  Jakarta 
West  Java  border.27  Comparing  similar  types  of  enterprises,  they  examine 
the employment  impact  of  the minimum  wage  using  the  same  census  data 
as we  use  in  this  study,  but  they  focus  exclusively  on  firms  in  the  clothing, 
textiles,  leather,  and  footwear  industries.  They  find  no  employment  impact 
for  large firms?foreign  or  domestic. 
In  table  5 we  use  the difference-in-differences  (DID)  approach  adopted 
by Card  and Krueger  to examine  the  impact  of minimum  wages  on  employ 
ment  in Indonesia.28 We  focus  on  the changes  in employment  between  1990 
and  1996,  which  was  the period  of  the  large rise  in both  the magnitude  and 
compliance  with  the minimum  wage.  The  first  column  of  table  5  reports  the 
number  of  production  workers  in  1990  and  1996,  and  the  difference 
between  1990  and  1996.  The  third  row  reports  the difference  for  all  plants, 
while  the  fourth  row  reports  the difference  in employment  between  1990 
and  1996  only  for plants  with  data  on  employment  in both  years.  Across  all 
enterprises,  the mean  number  of  employees  increased,  from  an  average  of 
131  employees  per  plant  to an  average  of  149 employees  per  plant.  Column 
2  reports  those  same  differences  for  plants  outside  textiles,  apparel,  and 
footwear  (TFA),  while  column  3  reports  those  changes  for plants  only  in the 
textiles,  apparel,  and  footwear  sector.  Column  4  reports  the  difference-in 
differences,  which  is  the  difference  in  the  change  in employment  across 
TFA  and  non-TFA  firms  between  1990  and  1996.  As  indicated,  the differ 
ence-in-differences  is positive,  suggesting  that  compared  to  the  change  in 
employment  across  other  types  of  enterprises  between  1990  and  1996,  the 
change  in employment  for TFA  plants  was  larger. The  results  suggest  that 
increased  vigilance  vis-?-vis  textiles  and  apparel  enterprises  did  not  appear 
to hurt  their employment,  at  least  relative  to growth  in employment  of  other 
types  of  enterprises. 
The  sections  of  table  5  redo  this  analysis  in different  ways.  The  second 
section  of  table  5  assesses  the  difference-in-differences  in  employment 
change  for  exporters  only,  followed  by  a  section  with  analysis  for  foreign 
enterprises  only.  Comparing  the  results  across  the  first  three  sections  of 
table  5,  there  is no  evidence  that  greater  compliance  with  the minimum 
wage  negatively  affected  employment  in  foreign  enterprises,  exporting 
27.  See  Card  and  Krueger  (1994). 
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Table  5.  Changes  in  Mean  Number  of  Production  Workers 
TFA  only 
- 
All  plants  Non-TFA  TFA  only  non-TFA 
All firms 
1990  131  118  182  +64 
1996  149  125  283  +158 
Change  1990-96  +18  +7  +101  +94 
Change  1990-96  for  firms  with 
data in both years  +46  +34  +132  +98 
Firms  that  exported  in  1996 
1990  131  118  182  +64 
1996  421  328  718  +390 
Change  1990-96  +290  +210  +536  +326 
Change  1990-96  for  firms  with 
data in both years  +181  +125  +356  +231 
Firms  with  foreign  ownership,  1996 
1990  371  297  782  +485 
1996  506  352  1110  +758 
Change  1990-96  +135  +55  +328  +273 
Change  1990-96  for  firms  with 
data in both years  +194  +113  +458  +345 
Exporters  only 
Low  minimum  wage 
1990  384  326  558  +232 
1996  300  249  724  +475 
Change  1990-96  -84  -77  +166  +243 
High  minimum  wage 
1990  323  324  322  -2 
1996  470  348  694  +346 
Change  1990-96  +147  +24  +372  +348 
Nonexporters  only 
Low  minimum  wage 
1990  91  75  141  +66 
1996  72  63  118  +55 
Change  1990-96  -19  -8  -23  -11 
High  minimum  wage 
1990  87  88  83  -5 
1996  107  103  121  +18 
Change  1990-96  +20  +15  +38 +18 Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  79 
enterprises,  or  textiles  and  apparel  producers.  In fact  it  is clear  from  table  5 
that employment  growth  was  significantly  higher  for  exporters  and  foreign 
enterprises,  as well  as  for  textiles  and  apparel  plants.  The  last  two  sections 
of  table  5  provide  a breakdown  of  high  and  low minimum  wage  regions. 
Within  TFA  enterprises,  either  for exporters  or  nonexporters,  there  is no  evi 
dence  that higher  minimum  wages  negatively  affected  employment.  These 
results  are  consistent  with  Alatas  and Cameron.29  These  somewhat  unortho 
dox  results  are  the  subject  of  further  research  by  the authors. 
Conclusions 
This  paper  addresses  an  ongoing  concern  that  globalization  is eroding 
labor  standards.  Despite  the  increasing  attention  to  this  issue,  there  have 
been  no  direct  tests  of whether  firms  are more  or  less  likely  to comply  with 
labor  standards  when  they  are  faced  with  international  competition.  We 
derive  an  explicit  test:  are multinationals  or  exporting  enterprises  more  or 
less  likely  to comply  with  minimum  wage  legislation  than  other  types  of 
firms?  The  broad  trends  during  the  1990s  suggest  that both  multinationals 
and  exporting  firms  are more  likely  to comply  with  labor  standards.  These 
trends  are  reinforced  by  the  statistical  tests,  which  show  that  foreign  and 
exporting  enterprises  remain  more  likely  to comply  with  minimum  wage 
legislation. 
However,  if  we  add  controls  for  capital  intensity  and  technical  change,  the 
differences  in compliance  probabilities  between  foreign  plants  and  other 
enterprises  are  cut  in half,  and  the  likelihood  of  compliance  for  exporters 
switches  from  positive  to negative.  At  the beginning  of  the  1990s,  exporters 
were  significantly  less  likely  to adhere  to minimum  wage  laws  compared  to 
other  similar  plants.  It appears  that  the aspect  of  exporters  that  is associated 
with  greater minimum  wage  compliance  is  their greater  capital  intensity  and 
higher  investment  in  technical  change.  From  a policy  perspective,  there  are 
several  ways  to  increase  compliance  with  minimum  wage  laws. Encouraging 
export  activity  or  multinational  enterprises  is  one  approach.  Another 
approach  would  be  to encourage  policies  that  lead  to capital  investments  and 
investments  in new  technology.  Even  with  plant  controls,  however,  there  is 
no  evidence  that  multinationals  are  less  likely  to adhere  to  labor  standards. 
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We  also  find  that  there  is a  significant  upward  trend  in compliance  with 
minimum  wage  legislation  for  exporting  enterprises  during  the  1990s.  The 
probability  of  compliance  with  minimum  wage  legislation  for  exporting 
firms  increased  by  about  3 percent  a year. We  hypothesize  that  this  upward 
trend  is connected  with  pressure  from  the United  States  and European  gov 
ernments,  human  rights  activists,  and  news  coverage.  Turning  to an  exami 
nation  of  the  garment  and  apparel  industry,  which  has  been  the  focus  of 
human  rights  groups,  we  find  that  these  trends  are  even  more  striking  in  this 
sector.  The  significant  upward  trend  in compliance  with  minimum  wage 
laws  for  exporters,  combined  with  the  even  stronger  record  for  the  tradi 
tional  sweatshop  industries,  is  intriguing.  It  suggests  that  human  rights 
activism  in  fact  has  had  an  impact  on  firm  behavior.  The  combination  of 
activism,  international  pressure,  and  increasing  outward  orientation  by 
Indonesian  manufacturing  enterprises  suggests  that,  in fact,  it  is possible  to 
combine  more  globalization  with  higher  labor  standards.  The  results  also 
suggest,  contrary  to  expectations,  that  forcing  firms  to  adhere  to higher 
labor  standards  need  not  have  adverse  consequences  for employment. 
Overall,  the  evidence  in  this  paper  refutes  the  claim  that  pressures  to 
compete  in  the global  market  place  are  creating  a  race  to  the  bottom.  The 
evidence  for  Indonesia  in  the  1990s  suggests  that  firms  touched  by  the 
global  market  place  were  more,  not  less,  likely  to comply  with  labor  stan 
dards.  In part  this  increase  in compliance  is  likely  to have  resulted  from 
pressure  imposed  by  the United  States,  which  used  the GSP  as  a mechanism 
to enforce  labor  standards  in  Indonesia,  combined  with  increasing  human 
rights  activism.  Quantifying  the  linkages  between  U.S.  pressure,  human 
rights  activism,  and  labor market  outcomes  is  the  topic  of  further  research. 
What  is  truly  remarkable  is  that compliance  increased  despite  a doubling  of 
the  real  value  of  the minimum  wage  in  Indonesia  during  this period,  enor 
mous  increases  in foreign  investment  and  export  sales,  and  a painful  cur 
rency  crisis  that erupted  in  late  1997. Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  81 
Table  A-l.  Nominal  Regional  Minimum  Wage  in  Indonesia,  1985-2000 
1 
Rupiah/month_ 
Province  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Aceh  42,000  42,000  42,000  42,000  63,990  63,990  63,990 
North  Sumatra  25,500  25,500  25.500  36,000  36,000  57,900  57,900  76,500 
Riau  33,750  33,690  42,000  55,950  55,950  60,000  60,000  81,000 
Riau  Islands  33,750  33,690  42,000  55,950  55,950  60,000  60,000  81,000 
RiauBatam  73,500  73,500  73,500  166,500  166,500 
West  Sumatra  30,000  30,000  60,000  48,000  48,000  52,500 
Jambi  28,500  28,500  28,500  33,000  33,000  33,000  49,500  63,000 
South  Sumatra  33,000  33,000  48,000  48,000  48,000 
South  Sumatra 
Islands  33,000  33,000  48,000  48,000  48,000 
Bengkulu  39,000  39,000  39,000  39,000  60,000 
Lampung  18,000  18,000  31,500  31,500  31,500  52,500  52,500  52,500 
Jakarta  39,000  39,000  48,000  48,000  48,000  63,000  75,000  75,000 
West  Java  I  20,250  20,250  22,500  22,500  22,500  36,000  54,000  54,000 
West  Java  II  20,250  20,250  22,500  22,500  22,500  36,000  54,000  54,000 
West  Java  III  20,250  20,250  22,500  22,500  22,500  36,000  54,000  54,000 
West  Java  IV  20,250  20,250  22,500  22,500  22,500  36,000  54,000  54,000 
Central  Java  19,050  19,050  19,050  23,400  23,400  23,400  48,000  48,000 
Yogyakarta  13,500  13,500  21,000  21,000  21,000  27,000  27,000  37,500 
East  Java  I  19,050  19,050  24,390  24,390  24,390  42,270  42,270  63,000 
East  Java  II  19,050  19,050  24,390  24,390  24,390  42,270  42,270  63,000 
East  Java  III  19,050  19,050  24,390  24,390  24,390  42,270  42,270  63,000 
East  Java  IV  19,050  19,050  24,390  24,390  24,390  42,270  42,270  63,000 
Bali  I  30,000  30,000  36,000  36,000  36,000  54,000  54,000  60,000 
Bali  II  30,000  30,000  36,000  36,000  36,000  54,000  54,000  60,000 
West 
Kalimantan  30,000  30,000  30,000  42,000  42,000  42,000  54,000  54,000 
Central 
Kalimantan  25,500  25,500  30,000  30,000  30,000  48,000  48,000 
South 
Kalimantan  19,500  28,500  28,500  28,500  34,500  34,500  39,000  68,250 
East  Kalimantan  30,000  30,000  30,000  48,000  48,000  48,000 
South 
Sulawesi  27,000  27,000  27,000  30,000  30,000  30,000  40,500  52,500 
Central 
Sulawesi  21,000  21,000  21,000  25,500  33,000  33,000 
Southeast 
Sulawesi  15,000  22,500  22,500  22,500  22,500  47,970  47,970  63,750 
North  Sulawesi  15,750  15,750  25,500  25,500  25,500  25,500  60,000  60,000 
West  Nusa 
Tenggara  15,000  15,000  19,500  19,500  19,500  38,250  38,250  45,000 
East  Nusa 
Tenggara  30,000  30,000  30,000  48,000  48,000  48,000 
Molucca  30,000  30,000  54,000  54,000  54,000 
West  Papua  48,000  48,000  48,000  48,000  54,000  54,000  72,000  72,000 
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Table  A-l.  Nominal  Regional  Minimum  Wage  in  Indonesia,  1985-2000  (continued) 
Rupiah/month_ 
Province  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Aceh  78,000  94,500  105,000  115,500  128,000  147,000  171,000  265,000 
North  Sumatra  93,000  112,500  126,000  138,000  151,000  174,000  210,000  254,000 
Riau  81,000  93,000  124,500  138,000  151,500  174,000  218,000  250,700 
Riau  Islands  81,000  93,000  124,500  138,000  151,500  174,000  218,000  300,000 
RiauBatam  166,500  202,500  202,500  220,500  235,000  270,000  290,000  350,000 
West  Sumatra  57,000  75,000  97,500  108,000  119,000  137,000  160,000  200,000 
Jambi  72,000  90,000  99,000  108,000  119,500  137,500  150,000  173,000 
South  Sumatra  69,000  90,000  105,000  115,500  127,500  146,500  170,000  196,000 
South  Sumatra 
Islands  69,000  90,000  105,000  115,500  135,000  155,500  181,000  209,000 
Bengkulu  60,000  90,000  105,000  115,500  127,500  146,500  150,000  173,000 
Lampung  73,500  90,000  105,000  114,000  126,000  145,000  160,000  192,000 
Jakarta  90,000  114,000  138,000  156,000  172,500  198,500  231,000  286,000 
West  Java  I  66,000  114,000  138,000  156,000  172,500  198,500  230,000  286,000 
West  Java  II  66,000  114,000  138,000  142,500  157,500  181,000  210,000  245,000 
West  Java  III  66,000  114,000  138,000  132,000  145,500  167,500  200,000  230,000 
West  Java  IV  66,000  114,000  138,000  129,000  139,000  160,000  195,000  225,000 
Central  Java  60,000  81,000  90,000  102,000  113,000  130,000  153,000  185,000 
Yogyakarta  48,000  66,000  85,500  96,000  106,500  122,500  130,000  194,500 
East  Java  I  63,000  90,000  111,000  120,000  132,500  152,500  182,000  236,000 
East  Java  II  63,000  90,000  111,000  117,000  127,500  146,500  174,000  212,000 
East  Java  III  63,000  90,000  111,000  111,000  121,000  139,000  166,000  208,000 
East  Java  IV  63,000  90,000  111,000  108,000  116,500  134,000  160,000  202,000 
Balil  75,000  99,000  117,000  127,500  141,500  162,500  187,000  214,300 
Bali  II  75,000  99,000  117,000  127,500  141,500  162,500  166,000  190,300 
West 
Kalimantan  67,500  90,000  105,000  114,000  126,500  145,500  175,000  228,000 
Central 
Kalimantan  70,500  82,500  111,000  124,500  138,000  158,500  195,000  285,000 
South 
Kalimantan  68,250  90,000  105,000  114,000  125,000  144,000  166,000  200,000 
East 
Kalimantan  72,000  97,500  126,000  138,000  153,000  176,000  194,000  233,000 
South  Sulawesi  52,500  69,000  93,000  102,000  112,500  129,500  148,000  200,000 
Central 
Sulawesi  52,500  69,000  84,000  96,000  106,500  122,500  150,000  203,000 
Southeast 
Sulawesi  63,750  84,000  100,500  109,500  121,000  139,000  160,000  210,000 
North  Sulawesi  60,000  81,000  97,500  108,000  118,000  135,500  155,000  186,000 
West  Nusa 
Tenggara  54,000  70,500  88,500  97,500  108,000  124,000  145,000  180,000 
East  Nusa 
Tenggara  63,000  75,000  87,000  96,000  106,500  122,500  143,000  184,000 
Molucca  69,000  93,000  114,000  123,000  136,000  156,500  180,000 
West  Papua  105,000  135,000  142,500  154,500  170,000  195,500  225,000  315,000 Comments  and 
Discussion 
Susan  Collins:  In  this paper  Ann  Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  revisit  from  a 
new  perspective  the  controversial  question  of whether  globalization  erodes 
labor  standards.  Using  panel  data,  the  authors  examine  determinants  of 
whether  firms  comply  with  minimum  wage  regulations  in  Indonesia.  The 
empirical  analysis  makes  use  of  the  annual  manufacturing  survey  for 
1990-99,  which  provides  considerable  detail  about  firm  characteristics  and 
behavior. 
The  authors  find  that foreign-owned  firms  are more  likely  to comply  than 
domestic  firms.  Interestingly,  the  compliance  probability  for  domestic 
exporters  appears  to have  increased  over  time,  which,  the  authors  hypothe 
size,  reflects  the  impact  of  international  pressures  to  improve  labor  stan 
dards.  By  the  end  of  the  sample  period,  Indonesian  firms  that  export  have 
become  more  likely  to comply  than  nonexporting  domestic  firms.  These 
results  are  statistically  significant  and  quite  robust.  Thus  the  authors  con 
clude  that  there  is no  evidence  of  a race  to  the bottom  or  that globalization  is 
eroding  labor  standards. 
This  paper  has  many  strengths.  In particular  the  empirical  analysis  is 
done  carefully  and  generates  results  that  are  plausible,  though  provocative. 
The  authors  have  explored  many  suggestions  and  issues  raised  regarding  an 
earlier  draft  of  their  paper,  enabling  them  to dispel  some  initial  criticisms. 
The  richness  of  the data  used  and  details  of  the  Indonesian  experience  make 
this  an  unusual  and  interesting  episode  to examine.  In particular  there  is 
considerable  variation  in  Indonesia's  minimum  wages,  both  over  time  and 
across  regions  in any  given  year. 
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As  already  stated,  I find  the basic  results  in  the paper  both  plausible  and 
interesting.  However,  I would  argue  that  the  authors  sometimes  push  their 
preferred  interpretation  (that  this  is evidence  against  globalization  eroding 
labor  standards)  too  far.  My  comment  discusses  this  point  from  a variety  of 
perspectives.  I  suggest  some  dimensions  of minimum  wage  compliance 
that,  in my  view,  warrant  further  analysis  and would  enrich  our  understand 
ing of  the  Indonesian  experience. 
There  is considerable  evidence  in  the existing  literature,  based  on  studies 
for  a range  of  different  countries,  that both  foreign-owned  firms  and  domes 
tic exporters  tend  to pay  higher  wages.1  From  this  perspective,  the finding 
here  (that  such  firms  are  less  likely  to pay  below  the minimum  wage)  is not 
at  all  surprising.  Indeed,  after  controlling  for  a  fuller  set of  plant-level  char 
acteristics,  the  authors  note  that  their  results  "provide  an  explanation  why 
multinationals  and  exporters  are more  likely  to pay  the minimum  wage: 
they  are more  capital  intensive,  highly  productive  enterprises  whose  work 
ers  are more  highly  paid."  Furthermore,  when  the authors  control  for  capital 
intensity  and  other  plant  characteristics,  they  find  exporters  are  less  likely  to 
comply  than nonexporting  domestic  firms.  Given  these  results,  it  is  surpris 
ing  to  see  the authors'  suggestion  in  their paper's  conclusion  that encourag 
ing  export  orientation  or  foreign  ownership  may  be  a way  for policymakers 
in Indonesia  to raise  compliance  with  minimum  wage  laws. 
The  authors  focus  on  export  orientation  and  foreign  ownership  as  indica 
tors of  the extent  to which  firms  are  subject  to global  pressures.  Appropri 
ately,  they  have  explored  alternative  versions  of  these measures.  Their  ear 
lier work  defined  continuous  variables  and  linked  annual  changes  in  these 
measures  to compliance.  This  raised  concerns  such  as  reverse  causation.  In 
the current  version,  EXP  and FOR  simply  distinguish  firms  with  high  global 
exposure  from  those with  low  global  exposure.  The  fact  that  the  results  are 
robust  to  these  specification  changes  is reassuring. 
However,  the estimation  results  presented  in the paper  do  not  address  the 
bigger  underlying  concern  that EXP  and FOR  are  endogenous.  This  concern 
is exacerbated  by  defining  EXP  and FOR  as firm-specific  indicators,  which 
may  act  as  proxies  for  other  firm-level  characteristics  that are  not  included 
among  the  regression's  explanatory  variables.  If  these  omitted  firm  charac 
teristics  are  positively  correlated  with  the wage  the firm  would  choose  to 
pay,  then  the  coefficients  on EXP  and FOR  will  overstate  the  true effects  of 
1. See  Brown,  Deardorff,  and  Stern  (2003)  for  a  recent  survey. Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  85 
globalization  on  compliance.  The  analysis  at  the paper's  end,  which  controls 
for  plant-level  productivity,  does  begin  to address  this  concern.  Interest 
ingly,  FOR  remains  positively  and  significantly  related  to compliance.  And 
the authors  do  state  that  they  have  addressed  the potential  endogeneity  prob 
lem using  instrumental  variables  in other  work.  Additional  detail  here would 
be  useful,  as  this  is  important  to  convince  one  of  the  interpretation  the 
authors  give  to  these  coefficients. 
The  authors  suggest  that  pressures  from  human  rights  activists,  both 
internal  and  external  to  Indonesia,  help  to  explain  the  estimated  trend 
increase  in compliance  by  domestic  exporters.  (However,  if  such  pressure 
was  effective  in  increasing  compliance  of  domestic  exporters,  I  would  have 
expected  it  to have  an  even  greater  effect  on  foreign-owned  firms.  In  this 
context,  I find  puzzling  the  fact  that  the  authors  find  no  econometric  evi 
dence  of  increasing  compliance  among  foreign-owned  firms  over  time.)  The 
paper  clearly  documents  that  these  pressures  did  rise  during  the decade,  and 
that compliance  did  increase,  particularly  for exporters,  from  the middle  to 
the end  of  the decade.  But  while  I am willing  to believe  that  these  pressures 
played  some  role,  it seems  to me  that a  strong  case  for  this  linkage  requires 
a more  careful  look  at  the  timing  of  developments  than  the authors  provide. 
In fact  the compliance  data  provided  in  the paper  suggest  a  stronger  role  for 
an  alternative  factor  that received  little  attention  in  the authors'  analysis:  the 
evolution  of  the  real  value  of minimum  wages.  To  make  these  points,  it  is 
useful  to  summarize  the  trend behavior  of  average  minimum  wages.  I focus 
here  on  production  workers  only. 
The  paper's  figure  7  shows  average  compliance  each  year  for  domestic 
firms,  distinguishing  between  exporters  and  nonexporters.  Broadly  speak 
ing,  the  two  groups  exhibit  a  similar  pattern,  with  compliance  always  higher 
for  exporters  than  nonexporters.  During  1990-93,  compliance  is  relatively 
high  (over  70  percent  of  exporting  firms  and  roughly  55-65  percent  of  non 
exporting  firms).  Compliance  drops  sharply  in  1994,  and  slightly  more  in 
1995,  to about  55  percent  for  exporters  and  35-40  percent  for nonexporters. 
It begins  to  rise  for  both  groups  during  1996-97,  followed  by  greater 
increases  in  the  final  years  of  the  decade.  By  1999  over  70  percent  of 
exporters  again  comply  with  minimum  wage  laws,  comparable  to  the 
1991-93  period,  but  still  below  the  1990  level.  Just  over  50  percent  of  non 
exporters  complied  in  1999,  still  somewhat  below  the  levels  from  1990-93. 
Can  the  timing  of  increased  labor  rights  activism  help  to explain  these 
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unions  were  formed  in Indonesia  in  the early  1990s.  Externally,  we  are  told, 
U.S.  groups  filed  a complaint  under  GSP  in  1992  (and  previously,  in  1987). 
The  paper  also  provides  information  about  articles  in major  newspapers. 
The  paper's  figure  3  shows  that  articles  about  sweatshops  surged  in 
1995-96,  while  figure  4  shows  that  Indonesia-specific  articles  about  labor 
issues  (sweatshops  and  child  labor)  soared  in  1996.  Thus  the  1995-96 
increase  in compliance  may  have  been  responding  to pressures  from  the 
newspaper  coverage.  But  recall  that  this  increase  was  quite  modest.  Perhaps 
this  altered  external  environment  set  the  stage  for  the greater  1998-99  rise 
in compliance.  But  the compliance  decline  in  1994  (after  the  introduction  of 
new  local  unions)  is not  easily  reconciled  with  developments  in human 
rights  pressures  identified  in  the paper.  Clearly,  there  are  additional  factors 
at  work. 
Firm  compliance  would  be  expected  to vary  inversely  with  the  real mini 
mum  wage,  which  suggests  one  possible  factor.  A  casual  look  at  trends  in 
the  annual  average  minimum  wage  deflated  by  the CPI  suggests  this may 
indeed  have  played  a  central  role  in  firm  compliance.2  This  series  rises 
slowly  during  1990-93,  as  increases  in  the nominal  minimum  exceed  price 
inflation.  The  real  value  of  the minimum  wage  then  jumped  by  nearly  25 
percent  in  1994,  remaining  high  through  1997. However,  a  surge  in  inflation 
in  1998  then pushed  the  real  value  of  the average  minimum  wage  back  to  its 
1993  level.  These  developments  closely  match  both  the  1994  decline  and 
1998-99  rise  in firm  compliance  described  above.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
undertake  a more  formal  analysis  that  attempted  to  link  compliance  with 
labor rights  pressures  (perhaps  using  data  on  newspaper  coverage),  and  con 
trolling  for  additional  factors  such  as  the  evolution  of  the  real minimum 
wage. 
The  discussion  above  focuses  on  the behavior  of  the  average  minimum 
wage  over  time.  The  average  masks  surprisingly  large  differences  across 
regions.  As  pointed  out  by Vivi  Alatas  and Lisa  Cameron,  "this  gives  rise  to 
arbitrary  differences  in  the  legal minimum  between  firms  that are  geograph 
ically  close  but  on  different  sides  of  provincial  borders.  A  particularly  strik 
ing  difference  in minimums  occurs  within  the  bounds  of Greater  Jakarta 
(which  is  the manufacturing  hub  of  Indonesia),  part  of  which  is  in  the 
2.  The  annual  average  minimum  wage  data  were  supplied  by  the  paper's  authors.  This 
series  was  deflated  by  the CPI  (obtained  from  International  Monetary  Fund,  International 
Financial  Statistics)  to construct  the  real minimum  wage  for  Indonesia.  The  resulting  annual 
index from  1990 to 1999 (1995 =  100), is 60, 66, 69, 74, 92,  100, 100, 104, 75, 72. Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  87 
Table  6. Minimum  Wages  by  Province,  1988-99 
Rupiah/month_ 
Province  1988  1992  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Jakarta  48,000  75,000  13,8000  156,000  172,500  198,500  231,000 
West  Java I  22,500  54,000  13,8000  156,000  172,500  198,500  230,000 
West  Java II  22,500  54,000  13,8000  142,500  157,500  181,000  210,000 
West  Java III  22,500  54,000  13,8000  132,000  145,500  167,500  200,000 
West  Java IV  22,500  54,000  13,8000  129,000  139,000  160,000  195,000 
Source:  Data provided by Harrison and Scorse. 
province  of  Jakarta  and  part  in  the  neighboring  province  of West  Java."3 
Table  6  shows  the minimum  wage  for  Jakarta  and  the  four West  Java 
provinces  in  selected  years  from  1988  to  1999.  In  1988  the  Jakarta  mini 
mum  was  more  than  twice  that  in  West  Java,  but  by  1995  these  had  been 
equalized.  However,  considerable  variation  reemerged  in  1996,  with  the 
minimum  actually  declining  in two  of  the more  rural parts  of  Java  and rising 
in  the parts  closer  to Jakarta.  By  the end  of  the decade,  there was  an  18 per 
cent  gap  between  the highest  and  lowest  of  these minimums.  These  figures 
suggest  that  the political  economy  of  how  these  provincial  minimums  are 
set would  be  complex  and  interesting.  A  closer  look  at  these  issues  would 
provide  a more  nuanced  story  about  firm  compliance.  This  discussion  also 
suggests  that provincial  minimum  wages  should  be  treated  as  endogenous 
variables  in  the  econometrics. 
The  cross-section  variation  in  minimum  wages  is clearly  exploited  by  the 
panel  nature  of  the paper's  empirical  analysis.  But  it  would  have  been  inter 
esting  to push  this  analysis  further  and  explore  hypotheses  about  the  con 
centration  of  noncompliant  firms.  For  example,  what  accounts  for  the 
increase  in noncompliance  during  the mid-1990s?  Is  it primarily  explained 
by  firms  that are  temporarily  out  of  compliance,  such  as  those  in provinces 
with  sharp minimum  wage  increases  that  take  a year  or  two  to  raise  their 
own  wages  accordingly?  Or  is  it  mainly  because  a  subset  of  firms  persist 
ently  pay wages  below  the  legal minimum? 
In  sum, Harrison  and  Scorse  have  provided  a useful  look  at  the determi 
nants  of  compliance  with  minimum  wage  laws  in  Indonesia  during  the 
1990s.  Not  surprisingly,  multinationals  are  consistently  more,  not  less, 
likely  to comply.  And  their  likelihood  of  compliance  does  not  seem  to have 
3. Alatas  and  Cameron  (2003,  pp.  2-3). 88  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
increased  despite  dramatically  increased  attention  to  labor rights  in Indone 
sia by  international  activists.  Controlling  for plant  characteristics,  domestic 
exporters  were  initially  less  likely  to comply.  But  their  compliance  did  seem 
to rise  over  time,  perhaps  responding  to  such  pressure.  This  is  interesting 
and  provocative.  To  really  pin  down  the  role  of  such  international  pressures 
will  require  further  work  that  reflects,  among  other  things,  the  complex 
interaction  between  the political  economy  of minimum  wage  setting  and 
additional  details  about  the  timing  of  various  developments.  This  most 
likely  will  entail  some  case  study  analysis  across  provinces  to complement 
the econometric  work.  I look  forward  to seeing  additional  pieces  in  the  story 
uncovered. 
Kimberly  Ann  Elliott:  Ann  Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  have  written  a very 
interesting  and  provocative  paper  exploring  the  linkages  among  globaliza 
tion,  labor  standards,  and  the potential  impact  of  the  antisweatshop  move 
ment  on  Indonesian  workers.  Contrary  to concerns  expressed  by  antisweat 
shop  activists,  Harrison  and  Scorse  find  little  evidence  of  a  race  to  the 
bottom  arising  from  globalization?and  none  at  all  in  the  targeted  textile, 
apparel,  and  footwear  sectors.  But  contrary  to  the  concerns  expressed  by 
supporters  of  globalization,  neither  did  the  authors  find  that  increased 
wages,  perhaps  spurred  by  activist  pressures,  negatively  affected  employ 
ment.  As  someone  who  likes  to  use  the metaphor  of  Siamese  twins  to 
describe  the  relationship  between  globalization  and  labor  standards,  I find 
this  is a gratifying  result. 
Using  plant-level  data  from  Indonesia's  annual  manufacturing  survey, 
the  authors  analyze  whether  foreign-owned  and  exporting  plants  were  more 
or  less  likely  than  domestic  plants  to comply  with  Indonesia's  legal  mini 
mum  wage  during  the  1990s,  a  time  when  the minimum  wage  doubled  in 
real  terms. The  general  results  are  similar  to  those  in numerous  other  papers 
(including  some  by  Harrison),  which  find  that  foreign-owned  firms  in 
developing  countries  pay  more,  on  average,  than  local  firms  supplying  the 
local market.  Like  many  other  studies,  this paper  also  finds  that most  of  the 
difference  can  be  explained  by  higher  capital  intensity,  the  need  for  rela 
tively  higher  skills,  and  other  plant-  and  sector-specific  characteristics.  Thus 
they  conclude  that multinational  corporations  are  not  encouraging  a  race  to 
the bottom  by  squeezing  wages  in poor  countries. 
The  story  gets more  interesting  and  less  conventional  when  Harrison  and 
Scorse  look  at  exporting  firms.  After  controlling  for  worker  and  plant Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  89 
specific  characteristics,  the  authors  find  that  in  the  early  and mid-1990s, 
firms  with  substantial  exports  were  less  likely  to comply  with  the minimum 
wage  law  than  similar  plants  that did  not  export.  But  Harrison  and  Scorse 
also  show  that exporter  compliance  increased  over  the decade,  even  as  the 
real minimum  wage  was  rising,  and  that compliance  was  actually  better  and 
increased  even  faster  in  the  textile,  apparel,  and  footwear  sectors.1  They 
hypothesize  that  the  increasing  compliance  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1990s 
might  be  explained  by  pressures  from  the U.S.  government  and  transna 
tional  activists. 
To  explore  whether  higher  minimum  wages  and  improved  compliance 
contributed  to  increased  unemployment,  Harrison  and  Scorse  do  a differ 
ence-in-differences  analysis  of  changes  in  employment  across  different 
Indonesian  sectors.  Contrary  to  the  fears  of many  globalization  enthusiasts 
about  the  negative  effects  of  external  pressure  and  activist  demands  for 
higher  wages,  the  authors  find  that  relative  to other  sectors,  employment 
growth  was  higher  in foreign-owned  and  exporting  plants,  especially  in  the 
textile,  apparel,  and  footwear  sectors. 
These  are  intriguing  results.  But  there  are  other  extensions  of  the 
research  that could  go  further  in answering  the questions  raised  in  the paper. 
First  and most  obvious,  the  authors  have  demonstrated  only  a correlation 
between  increasing  compliance  with  minimum  wages  and  increasing  exter 
nal  pressure  (as measured  by  news  stories  on  sweatshops  and  child  labor).  It 
would  be  useful  to directly  test  the  hypothesis  of  a causal  relationship  by 
gathering  information  on  foreign  owners  or  exporters  that  sell  to buyers  that 
are members  of  one  of  the multistakeholder  code  of  conduct  initiatives, 
which  require  independent  monitoring  of  compliance.  This  analysis  might 
be  possible,  at  least  for  a  subsample  of  these  firms,  because  some  factory 
specific  information  (including  addresses)  is available  on  the  company's 
own  website  or  that of  one  of  the multistakeholder  initiatives,  such  as Social 
Accountability  International  and Fair  Labor  Association.  For  example,  as  a 
result  of  pressure  from  the  group  United  Students  Against  Sweatshops, 
many  colleges  and  universities  now  require  licensees  that produce  school 
logo  apparel  and  other  items  to disclose  contact  information  for  all  of  their 
suppliers. 
Second,  in an  earlier  version  of  the paper,  the authors  provided  a break 
down  by  gender  for  some  of  the worker  characteristics  (educational  attain 
1. They  find  no  change  in  the probability  of  compliance  by  foreign-owned  firms. 90  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
ment).  It would  be  interesting  to  test whether  this  information  could  be 
used  to explore  whether  there  are  any  differences  in gender  discrimination 
among  the various  types  of  firms.  Are  foreign-owned  firms  or  exporters  any 
more  likely  than  local  firms  to hire  or  promote  women  to nonproduction 
jobs?  Does  the gender  composition  of  employment,  after  controlling  for 
sector-specific  differences,  affect  the  likelihood  of  compliance  with  mini 
mum  wages  by  various  types  of  firms? 
This  last extension  could  also  address  criticisms  that  the paper  claims  too 
much.  The  motivation  of  the paper  is  to explore  the assertion  that globaliza 
tion  is contributing  to a  race  to  the bottom  in compliance  with  labor  stan 
dards.  But  the paper  addresses  only  one  such  standard?minimum  wages? 
and  that  standard  is  not  among  the  core  labor  standards  accepted  by 
international  consensus  as  appropriate  for  universal  application. 
The  core  standards,  as  defined  by  the  International  Labor  Organization 
(ILO)  are:  freedom  of  association  and  the  right  to  collective  bargaining; 
elimination  of  forced  labor;  abolition  of  child  labor;  and  nondiscrimination 
in employment.  It  is not  clear  that Harrison  and  Scorse's  results  on mini 
mum  wages  tell  us  anything  about  compliance  with  these  other  standards. 
Such  evidence  as  exists  from  the  ILO,  multistakeholder  monitoring,  and 
other  sources  suggests  that  firms  that  are  in  compliance  with  minimum 
wage  laws  probably  do  not  use  child  labor  or  forced  labor.2  But  there  is no 
reason  to  think  that  such  firms  necessarily  comply  with  nondiscrimination 
norms  or  respect  freedom  of  association,  and  there  is at  least  anecdotal  evi 
dence  to  the contrary. 
Finally,  the  authors  mention  but  do  not  discuss  the  results  of  an  exten 
sion  of  the  research  that  looks  at  the  implications  of  labor  standards  for 
firms'  exit  decisions.  If  there  is a  tendency  for  foreign  firms  to  exit  as 
labor  standards  rise,  this would  seem  to be  evidence  of  race  to  the bottom 
from  pressures  of  globalization?and  it may  not  be  a  race  to  the  bottom 
from  the  top  or  a  race  to  the  bottom  across  the  board.  Rather  it  may  be  a 
race  to  the bottom  from  the bottom,  among  similarly  situated  developing 
countries  and,  in particular,  in  low-wage,  highly  price-competitive,  and 
internationally  mobile  sectors  like  apparel  and  footwear.  This  conclusion 
might  be  undermined  by  the  results  on  rising  employment,  including  in 
2.  For  an  overview  of  the  global  status  of  compliance  with  each  of  the  four  core  stan 
dards,  see  International  Labor  Office  (2000,  2001,  2002,  2003).  For  a  brief  summary  and 
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the  textile,  apparel,  and  footwear  sectors.  But  this  could  be  a  short-term 
effect,  and  so  results  on  firm  exit  would  also  be  enlightening  on  these 
issues. 
In  the  case  of  Indonesia  at  the  end  of  the  sample  period,  one  also  has  a 
new  (admittedly  weak)  democracy,  which  is  trying  to raise  labor  standards 
and,  importantly,  relax  restrictions  on  freedom  of  association  and  collective 
bargaining  rights.  In  this context,  Harrison  and  Scorse's  comment  that Nike 
is planning  to move  many  of  its  factories  from  Indonesia  to  lower-wage 
Vietnam,  purportedly  because  of  the  latter  country's  greater  political  stabil 
ity,  is disturbing.  Shunning  an  emerging  democracy  in favor  of  an  authori 
tarian  regime  that  bans  independent  unions  may  make  perfect  business 
sense,  but  it also  has  the whiff  of  a race  to  the bottom. 
Discussion:  The  discussion  focused  mostly  on  the  interpretation  of  the 
empirical  results  reported  in  the  paper.  Tom  Palley  reiterated  Susan 
Collins's  point  that  it  would  be  better  if  the paper's  focus  was  stated  as min 
imum  wage  compliance  rather  than globalization  or  the  race  to  the bottom. 
Palley  also  raised  what  he  thought  were  anomalies  in  some  of  the  regres 
sions.  The  log  of  the minimum  wage  enters  with  a positive  and  significant 
coefficient  in  some  cases,  while  the compliance  model  says  there  should  be 
lower  compliance  when  the minimum  wage  goes  up.  The  coefficient  on 
multinational  presence  goes  away  when  labor  force  characteristics  are  con 
trolled  for,  which  seems  to weaken  some  of  the  conclusions  at  the  end. 
Ransford  Palmer  expressed  surprise  that  there was  no  labor  union  variable 
in  the model.  Where  unions  are  strong,  wage  rates  and  compliance  are  likely 
to be  higher. 
Robert  Blecker  wondered  how  well  the paper  is able  to address  the  race 
to  the  bottom  issue  with  the kind  of  data  and methods  that  are  being  used 
here.  There  are  some  fairly  obvious  reasons  why  one  would  expect  export 
ing firms  and  firms  with  foreign  investment  to pay  higher  wages.  The  race 
to  the bottom  argument  relates  to  the  idea  that  if you  comply  with  minimum 
wage  legislation,  the  investment  may  move  to Vietnam,  China,  or  some 
other  place.  The  paper  does  not  look  directly  at  this. While  there may  be 
problems  in getting  data  on  this,  one  might  want  to  look  at  global  market 
shares  and  the extent  to which  firms  in Indonesia  are  competing  with  firms 
in other  locations,  where  standards  are  lower.  Blecker  also  wondered  if  the 
results  might  be  capturing  an  exchange  rate  effect,  as  the  rupiah  is  sharply 
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exporting  firms  over  time,  since  Indonesian  exports  have  become  much 
more  competitive  as  a result  of  the devaluation. 
Penny  Goldberg  commented  that  the paper  missed  out  on  one  angle  of 
the  race  to  the  bottom  argument,  namely  the  claim  that  firms  that  are 
exposed  to  import  competition  may  outsource  activities  to  small  firms  or 
hire  temporary  workers  who  are  paid  much  less  than  the minimum  wage. 
Suppose  big multinational  or  export  firms  continue  to pay  high  wages,  but 
outsource  the  low-skill  activities  to  small  firms  as  a  response  to  increased 
import  competition.  The  analysis  in  this  paper  would  miss  this  completely, 
and  the  firms  that  engage  in  this  practice  would  appear  to have  higher 
wages.  One  way  to pick  up  this potential  effect  is  to  look  at what  happens  to 
the  really  small  firms  in  the  sample,  as  presumably  these  are  the ones  that 
pay  lower  wages.  Goldberg  also  questioned  whether  the  average  wage 
might  be  picking  up  increased  dispersion.  For  example,  if managers' 
salaries  rise  significantly  while  some  people  get  paid  way  below  the mini 
mum  wage,  the  average  may  go  up while  those  at  the bottom  of  the wage 
distribution  are worse  off.  Looking  at  compliance  levels  for  those  with  the 
lowest  educational  qualifications  may  help  pick  this up. 
Thea  Lee  said  that as  a practitioner  of  anticorporate  global  activism  she 
found  the paper  puzzling.  She  did  not  think  the  argument  was  that  foreign 
companies  or  exporters  are more  likely  to  violate  labor  standards  than 
domestic  or  nonexporting  companies.  She  felt  that  the  issue  is  a different 
one,  namely  that  in a dynamic  and  competitive  global  economy  without  any 
minimum  standards  for  labor rights,  the  competition  between  governments 
and,  to  some  extent,  between  companies  will  sometimes  take  the  form  of 
labor  sweating?and  that  is bad  for workers  in both  poor  and rich  countries. 
By  contrast,  we  have  minimum  standards  for  a  lot of  corporate  issues,  such 
as  intellectual  property  rights,  investment  regulation,  or  financial  services. 
Moreover,  focusing  on  compliance  with  the minimum  wage  is really  an odd 
choice  for  the  international  labor  standards  debate,  because  there  is  really 
very  little  emphasis  on  enforcing  minimum  wages  or  raising  minimum 
wages  through  trade  agreements  in  the  WTO.  It  is  really  all  about  freedom 
of  association.  One  sees  countries  repress  labor  unions  in order  to keep 
wages  down  and  attract  direct  foreign  investment.  The  competition  between 
Honduras  and El  Salvador,  or  between  China  and Mexico,  is dragged  down 
by  one  bad  player.  China's  total  repression  of  independent  labor  unions,  as 
well  as  the  country's  huge  size  and  low wages,  cannot  be  ignored  by  other 
developing  countries,  since  they  inevitably  compete  with  China.  If workers Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  93 
had  the right  to form  a union  in any  country,  then multinational  corporations 
would  not  be  able  to  look  for  places  where  workers  have  the  fewest  labor 
rights. 
Aart  Kraay  expressed  concern  that  the  result  about  foreign  firms  being 
more  likely  to comply  may  be  driven  by  unobserved  characteristics  of  for 
eign  firms  that make  them  pay  higher  wages.  While  there  are  controls  for 
observable  determinants  of  productivity  in  the  regressions,  at  some  level 
productivity  is  fundamentally  unobservable.  Related  to  that,  there  is  the 
well-known  result  that foreign  firms  tend  to cherry  pick  domestic  firms  with 
better  skills.  Or  another  mundane  reason  is  that  foreign  firms  may  be more 
likely  to hire  expatriate  workers  who  drive  up  the  average  wage  of  the firm. 
In  this  connection,  it  is  surprising  that  the  initial  coefficient  for  exporters  in 
the first  year  is negative,  since  there  is quite  a bit  of  evidence  that exporting 
firms  tend  to be more  productive.  Kraay  also  wondered  about  alternative 
explanations  for  the finding.  It could  be  that exporting  firms  enjoyed  more 
rapid  productivity  growth  during  the  1990s  than  nonexporting  firms.  Or  it 
could  be  that  the minimum  wage  simply  rose  less  slowly  than  the  desired 
distribution  of  wages  that  firms  are willing  to pay.  The  latter  could  also 
explain  the puzzling  positive  coefficient  on  the minimum  wage. 
Dani  Rodrik  suggested  that  the problems  with  the  constructed  compli 
ance  rate  could  be  overcome  by  looking  at changes  in employment.  If  there 
are  two  different  types  of  firms,  one  of which  feels  the minimum  wage  more 
binding  than  others,  one  ought  to  be  able  to  see  it  in  the  employment 
responses  to changes  in  the actual minimum  wage.  The  timing  of  changes  in 
the minimum  wage  may  allow  a  simple  difference-in-differences  analysis  to 
check  whether  exporter  or MNE  firms  have  differentially  more  negative 
employment  responses  to rises  in  the minimum  wage.  Sylvia  Ostry  summa 
rized  findings  from  her  research  on  recent  developments  in  the  anticorpo 
rate globalization  movement  and  pointed  out  that concern  on  the  race  to  the 
bottom  in clothing  and  textiles  seemed  to be  largely  an American,  not Euro 
pean,  phenomenon. 
In her  response,  Ann  Harrison  replied  briefly  to  some  of  the  concerns 
that had  been  raised.  She  disagreed  with  Thea  Lee  and  argued  that  the wage 
behavior  of  exporters  and MNCs  remained  a point  of  contention.  She  also 
thought  that  focussing  on  compliance  with  the minimum  wage  was  appro 
priate,  since  otherwise  labor  standards  remain  a nebulous  concept.  With 
respect  to  the questions  about  the minimum  wage  switching  signs  in various 
tables,  she pointed  out  that  the  reason  is  that  the  sample  goes  from  ten years 94  Brookings  Trade  Forum:  2003 
of  data  to  three years  of  data. The  difference  in  the  signs  between  columns  is 
not  statistically  significant. 
Ann  Harrison  agreed  that  looking  at outsourcing  was  important.  She  also 
agreed  that  the higher  compliance  of  foreign  firms  in fact  is due  to charac 
teristics  not  picked  up  in  the first  set of  regressions.  When  controls  for firm 
characteristics  are  introduced,  foreign  firms  are  no more  likely  to comply 
than other  firms  with  the  same  characteristics. Ann Harrison  and  Jason  Scorse  95 
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